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ABSTRACT 
As experienced on 9/11 and learned from the Katrina Report, catastrophic disasters 
produce environments where situational awareness is low and high levels of uncertainty 
and equivocality exist.  As a result, due to decision-making limitations and an 
environment wrought with information inadequacies, decision making can become 
paralyzed.   
Using grounded theory methodology on disaster cases, and leveraging the theories 
and processes of Drucker’s business model, the military decision-making process 
(MDMP), the observe orient decide act (OODA) loop, and recognition-primed decision 
(RPD), making model from the fields of cognitive, social, and decision sciences, a 
descriptive decision process model emerged.  Catastrophic disaster decision-making 
model (CAT D²M²) is a simple and flexible process that can assist emergency managers 
in mitigating decision-making paralysis so that lives, the environment, and the economy 
can be sustained during catastrophic disasters.  It is anticipated that the findings and 
process model from this thesis will contribute further to the research on decision making; 
specifically during catastrophic disasters.   
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A. INTRODUCTION  
As an emergency manager at the World Trade Center (WTC) on September 11, 
2001 (9/11), I experienced first-hand the aftermath of terrorists flying two aircraft into 
two large buildings, leading to their collapse, which personally resulted in an 
overwhelming situation.  Wrought with high levels of uncertainties and low levels of 
information, it was difficult to understand the situation and make sense of what was 
unfolding.  Like many other first responders to the WTC, this was unlike any other event 
they and I had experienced (McKinsey Company, 2002, p. 40).  As a result of having 
limited decision-making abilities, in the decision-making environment, which has limited 
information, a quickly evolving event, and a high demand for decisions on emergency 
management operations, my decision-making temporarily became paralyzed.1  Paralyzed 
in the context of this thesis implies that the decision-making process became temporarily 
disorganized, resulting is a situation where decision-making became less efficient; 
however, decisions were eventually made.   
To show that my experience at the WTC was not the only situation where 
decision making became disorganized at an overwhelming situation, consider Hurricane 
Katrina.  During Katrina, conflicting and vague information resulted in “the failure to 
order timely mandatory evacuations [which] led to an incomplete evacuation” (United 
States House of Representatives [HR], 2006, p. 2).  In addition, a “blinding lack of 
situational awareness and disjointed decision-making compounded and prolonged 
Katrina’s horror” (HR, 2006, p. x).  This, too, was a situation that demonstrated 
limitations, such as when the decision-making environment has inadequate information 
and the ability of the decision maker does not meet the demands; decision-making can 
become paralyzed.   
                                                 
1 The author of this thesis was a lieutenant with the New York City Emergency Medical Services 
assigned to the New York City Mayor’s Office of Emergency Management as an emergency manager at 
the WTC during the 9/11 terrorist attacks.   
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In spite of the documented instances in what could be called decision-making 
paralysis, during both of these disasters, decisions were eventually made, some effective 
and others ineffective.   For example, during the WTC operations, there were effective 
decisions made on building evacuations (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon 
the United States [9/11 Commission], 2004, p. 305), which resulted in lives being saved.  
During Hurricane Katrina operations, there were ineffective decisions made on nursing 
home evacuations (HR, 2006, p. 115), which resulted in lives lost.  Perhaps it was 
because both of these disasters where beyond what had been experienced by decision-
makers in the past or that these disasters were simply overwhelming in scope.   
From an emergency manager’s perspective, because of the lives lost and the 
negative effects to the environment and businesses, both disasters could be categorized as 
catastrophic disasters.  This perspective is depicted by the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA) in the Catastrophic Incident Annex as, “any natural or 
manmade incident, including terrorism that results in extraordinary levels of mass 
casualties, damage, or disruption severely affecting the population, infrastructure, 
environment, economy, national morale, and/or government functions” (Federal 
Emergency Management Agency [FEMA], 2008, p. 1).  Both the terrorist attacks at the 
WTC and Hurricane Katrina fit the catastrophic disaster profile, and as a result both 
required decision making by emergency managers at a different level than any other 
disaster to preserve life, the environment, and the economy.   
To better understand a catastrophic disaster and that decision-making is different 
during one of these events, it is important to distinguish this rare type of event from a 
frequent emergency or a routine disaster and why decision making is so different.  In a 
paper differentiating between the three, Quarantelli (2006, p. 2) states that “disasters” are 
qualitatively different from everyday community emergencies; so are “catastrophes” a 
qualitative jump over “disasters,” meaning catastrophic disasters “require some different 
kinds of planning and managing than do even major disasters” (2000, p. 2).  By framing 
and defining a catastrophic disaster, it can be concluded that the WTC and Hurricane 
Katrina disasters had a significantly different environment than emergencies or routine 
disasters—an environment that produces overwhelming circumstances whereby situation 
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awareness is low, and there are high levels of uncertainty.  Yet emergency managers were 
still expected to make decisions on problems at a much different level, and therefore 
required a much different decision-making approach.   
The types of problems that need decisions in a catastrophic disaster are not 
everyday, routine problems, but the problems and issues are unique and important 
(McCaskey, 1982).  They can be classified as “wicked” problems as opposed to “tame” 
problems.  Unlike tame problems, where there is a mission and a solution that is clear, 
wicked problems are ill-defined, “distinguished by interconnections to other problems, 
and have uncertainties in a dynamic environment” (Lyles & Thomas, 1988, p. 131).  
They do not have a true or a false answer and cannot be evaluated immediately for 
effectiveness (Rittel & Weber, 1973, pp. 160–163).  For example, in a wicked problem 
such as the decision to evacuate lower Manhattan on 9/11, a decision such as this creates 
other decisions such as where evacuees will go and how will they get there, and the 
decision to evacuate cannot be quickly reversed, indicating that exercising decision-
making contingencies during a catastrophic disaster is not an option.  In addition, if not 
acted upon quickly by making a decision, wicked problems could have cascading 
consequences to other emergency management operations related to life, the 
environment, or the economy.   
In summary, emergencies or routine disasters are significantly different than 
catastrophic disasters.  As a result, catastrophic disasters contain wicked problems never 
before experienced by the emergency manager.  For this reason, the emergency manager 
is limited by stressors such as the ability to recall past experiences, the ability to process 
vague information in a short time period, and lack of time to gather the appropriate 
information from the disaster environment.  Therefore, the lack in the decision maker’s 
abilities, and the quality of information or the time needed to gather the information from 
the decision-making environment contributes to decision-making paralysis.  Regardless, 
emergency managers are still expected to make efficient and effective decisions.   
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B. PROBLEM STATEMENT  
Emergency managers may be able to recall on experiences from past emergencies 
or routine disasters to make decisions, but few have been through a catastrophic disaster 
and can draw from such an event.  During catastrophic disasters the ability to recall on 
past experiences to form recognizable patterns is not readily available, and intuition to 
make decisions may only serve up to a certain point, thereby causing limits to decision-
making.  As experienced on 9/11 and learned from the Katrina Report (HR, 2006), 
catastrophic disasters produce environments where situational awareness is low and high 
levels of uncertainty and equivocality exist.  As a result, due to decision-making 
limitations and an environment wrought with information inadequacies, decision making 
can become paralyzed.  This thesis considers mitigating decision-making paralysis and 
the absence of research given to this topic; specifically during catastrophic disasters.   
Reading through the National Response Framework and appendices, the National 
Incident Management System, the 9/11 Report or Katrina Report provides little guidance 
for emergency managers on decision-making or mitigating decision-making paralysis.  In 
addition, the education provided to emergency managers on the subject of decision-
making is inadequate.  For example, FEMA’s Emergency Management Institute is 
limited to one course, “Decision-making and Problem Solving,” as part of its Independent 
Study Program series (Emergency Management Institute, 2005).  The consequence of a 
lack in guidance and training in decision making is a void in recognizing and 
understanding how important decision making is and the significance in mitigating 
decision-making paralysis during catastrophic disaster operations.   
C. RESEARCH QUESTION(S) 
This thesis focuses on decision-making limitations that can lead to decision-
making paralysis during catastrophic disasters and the processes which describes how 
decisions in these types of situations are made.  The limitations include the decision-
maker’s abilities and situation awareness when making decisions on the evacuation of at-
risk populations, the decision to significantly alter disaster operations, or any other 
decision needed to preserve life, the environment, and the economy.  To better 
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understand decision-making limitations leading to and mitigating paralysis, the 
overarching question is:  How can a new model be designed to mitigate decision-making 
paralysis when the experience and situational awareness of the decision maker is low and 
the disaster environment has high levels of uncertainty and equivocality?  In seeking to 
develop this new model, the following sub-question will be addressed:  How can the new 
model leverage elements of existing decision-making models to mitigate decision-making 
paralysis? 
D. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH  
This thesis will begin the discussion of decision making during catastrophic 
disasters.  Specifically, the intent is to identify which decision-making models are best 
suited for mitigating decision-making paralysis during catastrophic disasters.  The 
findings from this thesis seek to develop a new descriptive decision process model by 
leveraging several existing decision-making models.  The intent of the new process is to 
describe how decision-making paralysis may be mitigated when addressing important 
disaster management issues such as the life safety concerns of first responders and the 
public, and decisions leading to a strategic change in disaster operations.  Pending the 
findings of this study, the author anticipates that this thesis will contribute to the research 
on decision-making and motivate additional inquiries into how decision-making 
processes developed for use during catastrophic disasters may be utilized by emergency 
managers in other situations.   
E. CONCLUSION  
This thesis considers decision-making paralysis and the absence of research given 
to the topic; specifically during catastrophic disasters.  Analyzing catastrophic disaster 
case studies, reviewing decision-making literature, and evaluating four existing decision-
making models creates an opportunity to contribute to the research on decision making.  




the research question is answered by providing a new process model for consideration to 
the research area of decision making to mitigate decision-making paralysis during 
catastrophic disasters.   
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II. THE 9/11 WTC DECISION-MAKING EXPERIENCE 
By following the timeline from the 9/11 report (2004), at 8:46 a.m., the first 
hijacked plane flew into the North Tower of the World Trade Center (9/11 Commission, 
2004).  At the same time, while walking out of 7 WTC (the New York City Office of 
Emergency Management (OEM) offices and the emergency operations center) was the 
first visual I had that something had happened on the opposite side of view (south side) to 
the upper floors of the North Tower.  Hearing the loud explosion and seeing the resulting 
destruction and fire to the north side of several of the upper floors of the North Tower 
created a series of emergency management issues requiring decisions.   
The first decision I had to make was to either stay at street level (Vesey and 
Church Streets) or go back up to the 23rd floor of 7 WTC into the emergency operations 
center (EOC).  Because of the vantage point from the south, it was unclear that an 
airplane had flown into the North Tower.  The only recognition that I could make was a 
loud noise and a fire. It was an explosion and limited to the North Tower.  I made the 
decision to return to 7 WTC and report into the EOC; however, once inside the EOC, I 
was given instructions to report to the New York City Police Department (NYPD) 
command post at Church and Vesey Streets.   
At approximately 9:00 a.m., while I was standing at the NYPD command post 
with senior management from OEM, reports began coming over the two-way portable 
radios that it may have been an airplane that flew into the North Tower, and that there 
was a second airplane headed our away.  Along with senior OEM staff, the decision on 
whether to evacuate OEM staff from the 23rd floor was considered.  As the city’s 
command center, the EOC would be needed to coordinate and facilitate emergency 
management operations for this unfolding event; however, it was still unclear and 
unconfirmed that a hijacked airplane had flown into the North Tower, and it was still 
unclear and unconfirmed that a second airplane was headed to the WTC.  From the south-
side vantage point, which I had at Church and Vesey, it looked like only the upper floors 
of the North Tower were on fire and the incident was limited to the North Tower.   
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At that moment, there was inadequate information on the current situation, 
confusion on what had happened, and uncertainties on what was being reported to 
happen.  From a personal perspective, the decision to evacuate the EOC stalled.  It was 
unsure that the OEM staff would be better off in the building, safe from falling debris, or 
evacuated out of 7 WTC in case the incoming airplane would fly into 7 WTC.  However, 
decisions were being made by other OEM senior staff inside the EOC to evacuate, which 
occurred safely at 9:30 a.m.  
At 9:03 a.m., the second hijacked plane few into the South Tower of the World 
Trade.  While still at the corner of Church and Vesey, seeing this airplane fly into the 
South Tower and witnessing the devastation it produced, the situation had become 
overwhelming.  After fleeing the area because of falling debris as the second airplane 
flew into the South Tower, there was still a disaster to manage with decisions to be made.  
There were decisions I was tasked with making, such as where the emergency 
management response vehicles would stage, and where an OEM forward command post 
would be located.  However, the incident was still evolving; there was confusion, limited 
information and uncertainties; and the decisions I was to make were not being made.   
Decision-making at this point was limited to the life-safety of first responders.  
This included my decision to move a NYC Emergency Medical Services (EMS) crew 
setting up triage and treatment area away from where debris from the North Tower was 
falling.  This illustrated that not all decision-making was paralyzed.  Decisions on the 
immediate situation were being made.  In other words, I was able to make decisions 
based on what could be seen as it was happening; however, other decisions, such as 
which roadways would be prioritized for access and egress routes for incoming first 
responder vehicles and which buildings in the WTC complex needed to be evacuated, 
were indecipherable because the information needed to make this decision was 
unobtainable at the time.  At this juncture, the incident continued to be dynamic and 
unfolding.   
At approximately 9:15 a.m., at one of the Fire Department of New York (FDNY) 
command posts on the west side of West Street in front of the World Financial Center 
(WFC), while seeking information to make the decisions on first responder vehicle access 
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and staging, I became involved in an interagency discussion regarding the evacuation of 
lower Manhattan.  To coordinate this level of decision making required information on 
the transportation resources that would be needed to effectuate the evacuation, roadway 
conditions, which direction evacuees would head in and where they would safely go.  
However, the two-way portable radio frequencies that would be used to gain that 
information were clogged with priority messages from police and fire rescue operations, 
resulting in a circumstance where gaining information for situation awareness was 
impossible.   
In the interim, “at approximately 9:30 a.m., a senior OEM Official ordered the 
evacuation of the facility after a Secret Service agent in 7 WTC advised him that 
additional commercial plans were not accounted for” (9/11 Commission, 2004, p. 305).  
This decision is evidence that given specific information a decision can be made.   
At 9:59 a.m., while I was attempting to address the request to coordinate the 
evacuation of lower Manhattan, the South Tower of the World Trade Center collapsed.  
At this point, after I sought refuge in an underground garage at the WFC, the debris from 
the South Tower collapse had cut off access to West Street.  This resulted in being 
confined to the WFC underground garage with other first responders.  At approximately 
10:15 a.m., once myself and the others confined to the garage found our way out, while 
walking along the rear of the WFC, at 10:28 a.m., the North Tower of the World Trade 
Center collapsed.  During this period, what limited information I had obtained to make 
decisions was irrelevant, and there was no decision on emergency management 
operations being made.  The catastrophic destruction of the two airplanes flying into the 
towers and collapsing was something I never before experienced.   
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Figure 1.   Towers (From Wired New York, 2011) 
The decisions from the time when the first plane flew into the South Tower and 
until the second tower (South Tower) collapsed where limited; yet remarkably certain 
decisions were made.  What enable some decisions to be made and others to become 
paralyzed to the point where the decisions were ineffective?  Was the decision by the 
senior OEM official to evacuate the EOC made based on the information readily 
available?  Was the decision I made to move the EMS crew away from a falling debris 
area based on information that could obtain immediately?  Was the inability to make a 
decision on which routes first responder vehicles would use because the situation was 
wrought with uncertainties?  This thesis attempts to discover high-level concepts that can 
be used to develop a decision-making process model so that decision-making paralysis is 
mitigated.    
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To answer the research question of how can a decision-making model best 
mitigate decision-making paralysis during a catastrophic disaster, the literature review 
focused on the areas of cognitive science, social science, decision science, and 
organizational studies.  Theories on decision-making from these areas have evolved by 
studying how humans make decisions and the steps involved.  For example, there is 
research that describes what people actually do (descriptive) and what people should do 
(normative or prescriptive) when making decisions.  The findings from the descriptive 
and normative research areas helps to account for decision-making limits and capabilities 
that are valuable in understanding decision-making theories and processes developed 
from the various research areas.   
Herbert Simon (1959) and James March (1994) are two examples of researchers 
who have studied humans in actual decision-making settings, such as chess masters and 
business executives.  Their studies have lead to developing prescriptive decision-making 
theories based on the principle that the decision maker has a tendency to acquire 
manageable rather than optimal amounts of information, and that it is difficult for 
decision makers to identify all possible alternative solutions (Simon, 1959).  Prescriptive 
theories developed by Simon and further researched by March on “satisficing,” “bounded 
rationality,” and “judgmental heuristics” have spurred additional exploration into how 
people make decisions.  For example, Nutt (2002) analyzed the sequences of mistakes 
and poor judgments that led to 15 well known decision-making debacles from the private 
and public sectors.  By studying the decisions people actually made, he suggests that a 
decision, in order to succeed, should follow five prescriptive stages: “collect info, set a 
direction, systematically search for ideas, grade those ideas against the chosen direction, 
and manage barriers” (Nutt, 2002, p. 41).  Noted organizational behavior theorists Karl 
Weick and Kathleen M. Sutcliffe also provide prescriptive information from their 
research on the importance of making sense of a situation prior to making a decision 
(2005).  Their research examines how circumstances can be talked into existence through 
words and salient categories and turned into a situation (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2005, p. 409).  
David Snowden has contributed to this theory by developing a sense-making tool to 
categorize a situation (1999).  The Cynefin model suggests ways a person frames or 
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places the situation and information into one of five areas of simple, complicated, 
complex, chaotic, disorder (Snowden, 1999) to make sense of the situation.   
However, theories on decision-making and sense-making such as Simon’s, 
March’s and Snowden’s are based on studies of experienced decision makers, such as in 
chess matches or in business settings, where low situational awareness, high uncertainty, 
and equivocality can be mitigated.  To bring the most relevant descriptive and normative 
decision-making literature forward, research conducted on situations closest to the 
context in which an emergency manager could potentially encounter decision-making 
paralysis was sought.   
For example, Weick’s 1993 study of the Mann Gulch fire in 1949 is a descriptive 
study of smokejumpers in a situation where experience was low and information 
unavailable, yet decisions needed to be made.  Using reports from the surviving 
smokejumpers, Weick explored how a series of poor decisions were made (1993).  He 
focused on smokejumpers inability to connect what had happened in their past 
experiences during forest fires, and why they were unable to make sense of what was 
occurring in the fast moving forest fire.  Weick’s descriptive research into this confusing 
circumstance puts forward the notion that when there is difficulty in making a decision, 
stepping back to make sense of the situation may be an effective step.  Additionally, 
Klein (1998) has conducted research in real-world environments describing subjects in 
what they actually do when making decisions.  His descriptive study of firefighters and 
soldiers in real-time situations illustrates how they handle difficult decisions under 
conditions such as time pressure and uncertainty by using mental models that have lead to 
developing a naturalistic decision-making model known as the “Recognition Primed 
Decision-making Model” (RPD).   
In summary, March and Simon studied chess players and executives to develop 
their decision-making theories.  March states that there is not always perfect and 
complete knowledge when making a decision, that “people can make rational decisions if 
only they can gather enough information” (1994, p. 15).  Simon’s findings have lead him 
to describing decision-making limits as “bounded rationality,” and he describes the use of 
prescriptive measures such as the use of rules-of-thumb or “heuristics” when making 
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decisions (Simon, 1959).  In continuing in the prescriptive area, Klein’s RPD model 
emerged while observing how firefighters and soldiers instinctively make decisions 
through mental recall.  His research reveals that experience and the ability to recall on 
experience lends itself to effective decision-making; however the subjects in his studies 
were observed making decisions in their operational setting based on how they would 
normally make a decision; which is by recalling on a past experience, or recognition, to 
make sense or size up the situation as a step in making a decision.  The chances of 
decision-making paralysis were minimal if not absent.  Weick, Sutcliff, and Snowden 
have raised the importance of sense-making by developing theories and models that 
prescribe ways to recognize a circumstance and through categorization turn the 
circumstance into a situation that can be understood and addressed.  However, there is an 
absence within the current research that addresses mitigating decision-making paralysis 
during a situation such as catastrophic disasters.    
The research question is framed to illustrate that there are limits to decision 
making; especially when the person’s experience is low and the situation (catastrophic 
disaster) is wrought with high levels of uncertainty and equivocality, thus causing 
decision-making paralysis.  The literature reviewed is absent in addressing this question 
or the issue that decision-making paralysis is a phenomenon that needs to be better 
understood.  Therefore, by using grounded theory as a research methodology, the intent is 
to leverage existing decision-making models to present a novel decision-making process 
as it applies to the management of catastrophic disasters that can be used to stimulate the 
emergency manager’s decision-making abilities when decision making becomes 
paralyzed.   
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III. METHODOLOGY 
In seeking to answer the main research question: How can a model be designed 
which mitigates decision-making paralysis during a catastrophic disaster when 
experience and situational awareness of the decision maker is low and the disaster 
environment has high levels of uncertainty and equivocality?  Grounded theory research 
(Glaser & Strauss, 1967) is used to better understand how decisions are made during 
catastrophic disasters.  Glaser and Strauss’ (1967) grounded theory approach is the 
systematic method of qualitative analysis used in this thesis to develop a substantive 
theory in the form of a theoretical model which describes how decisions are made during 
catastrophic disasters.   
Using grounded theory research to examine a set of disaster cases was selected 
because the topic of decision-making in the context of catastrophic disasters is an 
unfamiliar and under-researched concept requiring grounded exploration (Gioia, Thomas, 
Clark, & Chittipeddi, 1994, p. 367).   
A. CASE SELECTION  
Using grounded theory, to begin discovering how decisions are made during a 
catastrophic disaster, cases on past disasters were purposely selected.  The cases selected 
for this research provide data from a first responder/decision maker viewpoint.  For this 
reason, the narratives are taken seriously, and any prior views on decision-making during 
a disaster are not used during the data collection.   
Each disaster case was selected for theoretical, not statistical reasons (Glaser & 
Strauss, 1967) to “best support the development of the theoretical framework” (Locke, 
2001, p. 55), which in this study, is on decision making during a catastrophic disaster.  
The disaster cases do not contain any decision-making models.  The cases selected are 
similar in that they evolve around a catastrophic disaster situation; however, because they 
are of different types (hurricane, terrorist attack, fires), they each have a different 
dynamic that was examined for any differences in decision making.  They are accounts of 
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emergency managers in situations where the circumstances contained high levels of 
uncertainty and equivocality; such as during a category-5 hurricane or any other emergent 
disaster situation that requires decisions.   
B. THE SAMPLE CASES 
Data was collected by reviewing the accounts of several disaster cases (Howitt & 
Giles, 2009) that are descriptive and exploratory in nature.  The cases selected represent a 
research strategy likened to an experiment or a simulation (Yin, 1981).  The 
distinguishing characteristic of using cases, as opposed to interviews, is that it examines: 
“(a) a contemporary phenomenon in its real-life context, especially when (b) the 
boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident” (Yin, 1981).  In 
other words, the cases selected are actual accounts of what occurred during disasters, and 
the study of decision-making during the disasters was not the main reason for the authors 
writing the cases.   
The approach in using cases as a research strategy is to focus on understanding 
the dynamics in decision-making within a single setting (Eisenhardt, 1989), which is 
during a catastrophic disaster situation.  After conducting research on 10 disaster cases, 
six were found to contain narratives on issues related to the life safety of first responders 
or the public, lead to a strategic change in disaster operations, or described difficulties in 
mitigating the effects of the disaster.  Again, the cases selected did not contain any 
concepts or models on decision-making; they were chosen because they were 
catastrophic and, therefore, contributed to developing decision-making concepts and 
answering the research question.  
The six catastrophic disaster cases are as follows:  
1. The Baltimore Tunnel Fire of 2001 
2. 9/11 Pentagon Emergency  
3. 9/11 World Trade Center Terrorists Attacks—Fire Department Operations  
4. 9/11 World Trade Center Terrorists Attacks—Emergency Medical 
Services Operations  
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5. The 1999 Hurricane Floyd Evacuation in Florida 
6. The 2003 San Diego Firestorm  
C. DATA ANALYSIS PROCESS  
Once the six catastrophic disaster cases were selected and read, notes were taken 
to identify the key issues of the case and to begin the process of coding decision-making 
actions.  All six cases were independently analyzed line-by-line to research for common 
themes on how decisions were made.  Using Glaser & Strauss’s (1967) constant 
comparative method, the data generated from one case was compared to the data from the 
other cases.  As this iterative process progressed, notes evolved into codes, codes were 
developed into core categories that were then sorted further as theory began to emerge.   
To illustrate, to extract each decision-making point from the case study, each 
section was read line-by-line looking for either a decision made, information leading up 
to a decision, or a decision outcome.  Questions were asked such as: “Did the decision 
have a life-safety concern, or was the decision made on an emergency management 
operation?”  The sections of the case study that answered these types of questions were 
extracted and noted for its decision-making.  Once the first case was completed, the 
subsequent cases were compared to the preceding cases using the same process of 
reading and note taking.   
To distill the notes of all the cases further, and to continue building theory, the 
information gathered from the note taking was placed into an “informant’s code” 
grouping.  The informant’s codes are the actual words from the cases the decision makers 
used on what prompted the need for a decision, and what transpired as the decision was 
made.  To arrive at the informant’s codes categories, the notes were reviewed with the 
researcher asking: “Had the decision maker experienced something like this in the past, 
or did the decision maker need or have enough information to make the decision?”  For 
example, using the decision to evacuate the at-risk population during the Baltimore 
Tunnel Fire, the fire chiefs were quoted as saying, “A situation that had no parallels in 
their collective experience” (Scott, 2004, p. 203).  This quote was placed into the 
informant code category because it answered the question had the decision maker 
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experienced something like this in the past?  During the entire note taking and coding 
process, the data generated by each case was continually compared to the other cases 
looking for trends in data and the emergence of theory.   
It was noticed that the data emerging from the note taking and coding process was 
forming the beginning of a substantive theory that would become a descriptive decision 
process model.  This was that the decision makers were seeking specific details in 
making their decisions.  Furthermore, the details needed for the decisions were either 
sought out through situational awareness or required the decision maker to recall a 
similar situation to make the decision.  This preliminary theory was used to revisit each 
case study to make comparisons on the decision points as a way of grounding the theory 
and moving forward with the process. 
With a descriptive decision process model beginning to emerge and to ground the 
data further, another grouping was established called second order categories or “core 
categories” (Glaser & Strauss, 1967, p. 191).  The second order categories were 
developed by looking at each of the informant’s codes to see if the information on the 
decision was based on needing situation awareness or making observations prior to taking 
action on a decision.  In this instance, the codes situation awareness and making 
observations prior to taking action on a decision were turned into a core category named 
sensemaking.  The following seven categories emerged from the review of all the cases:  
1. Assessment  
2. Comparative evaluation  
3. Constraints/Limitations/Stress  
4. Pre-arranged  
5. Predicative estimations  
6. Recognition  
7. Sense-making 
The data and theory obtained in the process of coding and comparing the decision 
points was continually reviewed and compared to further identify any unique attributes 
the decision makers used in making decisions.  The comparative analysis on situation 
awareness and observations produced a further notion that there is an emphasis by 
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decision makers in disaster situations placed on pre-decision actions.  When there was a 
recurrence of core categories from the cases, the research stopped.  It was determined that 
saturation of the data was met (Glaser & Strauss, 1967).  At this point, there was enough 
data to clarify the parameters of the emerging descriptive decision process model.   
In summary, by doing comparative analysis on the data and theory, a pattern 
emerged across the cases that lead to recognizing decision-making relationships.  This 
“theoretical sensitivity” (Glaser & Strauss 1967) was used to better understand decision-
making, specifically during a catastrophic disaster.  As the pattern formed, the 
formulation of a descriptive decision process model materialized that can be applied to 
catastrophic disasters.  With the descriptive decision process model identified, the 
decision-making literature that focused on what people actually do when making a 
decision (descriptive), and what people should do (normative) was revisited.  The 
substantive theory that emerged during the constant comparison stage became connected 
to the descriptive decision process model found during the literature review.  Because of 
this, a triangulation was formed, and the research on the cases was affirmed to be 
grounded.   
D. CONCLUSION  
The final step is to take the theorized decision-making process and evaluate it 
against the research question and against the grounded theory methodology.  Questions 
that will be asked are: if the descriptive decision process model is a practical solution, is 
applicable to a catastrophic disaster situation, is easy for the emergency manager to 
understand and use, and provides a basis for future decision-making research.  
Furthermore, that the decision-making model being theorized is based on making sense 
of the situation and enhancing the decision maker’s abilities to ensure that decision-
making does not become paralyzed.   
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IV. CASE OVERVIEW AND ANALYSIS 
A. CASES REVIEWED  
All of these disaster cases selected were catastrophic.  In other words, catastrophic 
disasters such as these were beyond the normal scope of what decision makers had 
experienced in “community emergencies” and “disasters” (Quarantelli, 2000).  Therefore, 
these disasters presented something new and complex to the decision makers.  The 
emergency managers, fire fighters, and police officers in the cases were not designated as 
the decision makers for the disasters, nor was it noted anywhere in the disaster cases that 
these individuals received training or had specific expertise in making decisions.  Simply 
because of the position the individuals either found themselves in during these disasters, 
or because it was their responsibility as supervisors, they became decision makers.   
The catastrophic disaster cases are summarized to present an account of what 
transpired during each of the disasters as well as to analyze the decision-making that took 
place.   
1. The Baltimore Tunnel Fire of 2001 
In July 2001, a CSX freight train carrying paper products, plywood, soy oil, and 
chemicals derailed in a tunnel underneath the downtown area of Baltimore, Maryland.  
The initial response to the incident was thought to be a routine call by the fire department 
because reports of smoke emanating from the tunnel were a common occurrence, as 
trains would usually omit smoke in the area of the tunnel.  Because it was a train on fire 
in a tunnel and it was carrying chemicals, if it exploded it had the potential to become a 
catastrophic disaster.  To complicate the situation, a large water main break also occurred 
in the tunnel, the roadways above the tunnel were full of commuters, there was a school, 
concert hall, high-rise apartment building, and a baseball game at Camden yards would 
start in a few hours.  Yet still needed were critical decisions on fire suppression 
operations, evacuations, roadway shutdowns, and venue closings.   
 22
This was a situation that city officials “had no parallels in their collective 
experience” in managing (Scott, 2004, p. 203).  Not being able to remember a past event 
or past practice that fit this situation contributed to some of the difficulties officials had to 
make on decisions, such as evacuations and predicting or deciding how fire suppression 
operations should be conducted.  As a result of the incident being underground and out of 
full-view from the fire chiefs, situation awareness was low.  Therefore, the fire chief’s 
ability to make decisions was constrained resulting in decisions being made with what 
information was available at the time.  It was restricted and limited because of having to 
wait on reports from firefighters in the tunnel, information from the waybill, and the 
limited visual they had of the black smoke emanating out of the tunnel.  In addition, the 
decisions on evacuations, roadways shutdowns, etc., would create secondary problems; 
thus, additional decisions such as where would evacuees shelter and which roadways 
would take the diverted traffic.  These are not simple decisions to make and are time 
consuming when time is limited.   
2. The 9/11 Pentagon Emergency 
At 9:37 a.m. on September 11, 2001, (9/11 Commission, 2004) a Boeing 757 
hijacked by terrorist was intentionally crashed into the Pentagon - a U.S. military 
establishment which placed the incident into the realm of national security crisis.  In this 
case first responders were faced with a catastrophic situation where initial information 
about what had occurred at the Pentagon was unclear.  They did know about the plane 
crashes into the World Trade Center; however, they did not know if additional airplanes 
were on target for the Pentagon.  The combination of a plane crash, fire, and building 
collapse at a single location presented the Arlington County Fire Department with a 
series of incident command challenges to organize responders and investigators (Varley, 
2003, p. 235–234).   
In studying the case it becomes apparent the fire department personnel had never 
before encountered a situation of this scale requiring a host of decisions to maintain order 
and sustain rescue operations.  In this situation some of the fire chiefs were noted to be 
veterans of the department with many years of service (Varley, 2003, p. 237).  As a 
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result, their capacity to relate similar incidents (fires, building collapses, plane crashes) 
could serve to increase their recognition abilities; however, the environment they were in 
played a role in their decision-making abilities.  For instance, on evaluating the scene to 
make decisions on fire operations, one of the chiefs stated that “the sheer size of the 
Pentagon made it hard to get a comprehensive picture of the damage” (Varley, 2003, p. 
237).  This is an example where the decision maker had experience to make decisions yet 
the environment, the devastated Pentagon site, became a factor in the decision-making 
process.   
3. 9/11 World Trade Center Terrorist Attacks—Fire Department and 
Emergency Medical Services Operations 
At 8:46 a.m. on September 11, 2001, (9/11 Commission, 2004) the first of two 
planes hijacked by terrorists flew into the World Trade Center (WTC) buildings.  The 
incident consisted of two passenger airplanes crashing into two occupied high-rise 
buildings.  The buildings eventually collapsed onto several other large buildings within a 
16-acre site, killing first responders and civilians, destroying first responder vehicles, 
utilities, roadway infrastructure, and subway transportation lines.  The response to the 
incident was the largest New York City had ever encountered.  These two cases account 
for what the Fire Department of New York City (FDNY) and Emergency Medical 
Services (EMS) did to manage the incident as it unfolded, including information leading 
up to decisions on evacuating first responders and civilians out of the north tower and 
requesting mutual aid assistance.   
Because the magnitude of the incident required such a large response of FD and 
EMS resources, and many of those resources including the two-way radio 
communications system were affected during the collapse (McKinsey Company, 2002), 
decisions made by both agencies were made with limited information and situation 
awareness.  Ambiguity and inconsistency in the information at the WTC site influenced 
decision making to several operational areas, such as evacuations and staging of response 
vehicles.  In addition, although plans that would normally be used as decision-making 
tools on decisions such as the best access and egress routes for emergency vehicles, or 
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where to position a command post did not exist for an incident of this magnitude.  
However, decisions were made on staging locations and command post locations by 
decision makers using what little information they were able to obtain at that time.  
4. The 1999 Hurricane Floyd Evacuation in Florida 
On September 13, 1999, Hurricane Floyd approached the Florida peninsula.  
Emergency managers at the state level and from the communities along the coast 
predicted to be impacted called for an evacuation; however, the memory of Hurricane 
Andrew a few years earlier reminded residents of the devastation a hurricane this size 
could bring.  As the evacuation decision for Hurricane Floyd was made by emergency 
managers, residents not needing to evacuate “shadow evacuated.”  The result was 
roadway congestion that if Hurricane Floyd did remain as large as predicated and hit the 
coast, residents in transit would have been exposed to high winds and water while stuck 
in traffic on Florida highways (Husock, 2004, p. 283).   
This case depicts emergency managers confronted with what they thought they 
had planned for, yet the decision to evacuate resulted in a wide-spread traffic condition 
they had not foreseen.  The decision to evacuate was based on weather information at the 
time, historical knowledge of recent hurricane evacuations, and assumptions derived from 
hurricane evacuation behavioral studies conducted on residents along Florida’s coast.  
The evacuation decision was made; however, the decision makers did not take into 
account what the effects would be to the roadways as a larger than expected number of 
evacuees attempted to flee the area.  This disaster case illustrates that decision makers 
managed to make decisions during a stressful situation containing conditions such as a 
large number of people stuck on evacuation roadways while a strong hurricane 
approached their area.    
5. The 2003 San Diego Firestorm 
Beginning on October 2003, and lasting for a two-week period, southern 
California was subjected to numerous wild land fires.  Fifteen of the fires became major 
incidents or “mega fires” that endangered significant numbers of people and large 
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amounts of property (Lundberg, 2004, p. 305).  Those that became collectively involved 
in managing these incidents encompassed firefighters, sheriffs, military officials, and 
elected officials.  Those in the decision-making positions were faced with fires that 
outstripped fire suppression capabilities too quickly, fires that spread in a way never 
before experienced, and fire incidents absent full situational awareness.  Decisions ranged 
from the evacuations of residents to the management of the fires that included where the 
fire suppression resources would come from, and where they would be deployed.   
An interesting factor in this case was how the two-week duration of the fire storm 
seemed to work to the advantage of the decision makers.  As a result of prolonged 
operations, time was available for discussions on strategy level decisions, foresight on 
decisions was made, situation awareness was afforded the opportunity to evolve, and 
depending on the problem, decision makers were introduced along the way to provide 
comment on policies and procedures.  To illustrate, on the decision to activate military 
aircraft to assist with fire suppression for the Cedar Fire, elected officials, and those in 
charge of firefighting operations had time to reference federal policies.  As time evolved 
additional elected officials became involved and deliberations ensued prior to making 
decisions on the use of military aircraft.  It was a decision never made before for an 
incident which decision makers had never experienced (Lundberg, 2005, p. 322).  There 
were no quick decisions made in this instance.  Although extended operations appears to 
have played a factor in decision-making by way of recognition building and heightening 
of situation awareness, there were still several quick spreading fires within the two-week 
period that required quick tactical decisions.   
There was very little time to make decisions on which areas to evacuate or the 
locations to send fire crews to as fires spread quickly.  For example, realizing the fire in 
combination with the Santa Anna winds could compromise a route, in the decision not to 
send fire crews in on that route, decision makers used quick foresight into what the 
outcome of the decision would result in.  They used current weather information and 
intuition to predict that sending crews in on the route would jeopardize their safety.  In 
this instance, the decision-making environment and the decision maker’s abilities merged  
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to make the correct decision.  They made use of textual information from the fire and 
weather reports to build situation awareness for their environment, and their judgment to 
make the decision with a successful outcome.   
B. CONCEPTUAL CATEGORIES DISCOVERED  
Decisions were made in each of the disaster cases; however, at times the process 
of making a decision was not clear.  To recognize the decisions and how they were made, 
as mentioned in the method section, the narration of those involved with the disaster was 
transformed into recognizable decision-making codes or analytic codes.  For example, 
notes were taken on what the decision makers were quoted as saying.  The quotes were 
then converted into a description to make it easy to understand for the next step.  The 
analytic codes were then refined into second order categories (see Table 1).  A complete 
listing of the informant’s codes, analytic codes, and second order categories (categories) 
can be found in the Appendix.   
Table 1.   Second Order Categories and Descriptions 
 




Separating a complex topic into smaller parts to gain a 




Continually measuring options against the current 
information. 
Constraints/Limitations/Stress   Bounding  Identifying limitations and constraints to actions. 
Pre-arranged Targeting  Resorting to a set of predetermined rules or standards. 
Predictive Estimations Speculating  Forecasting, estimating, and hypothesizing.   
Recognition 
Recall 
Remembering from past events or past practices, 
assimilating to the situation, historical reflection. 
Sense-making 
Diagnosing 
Define the situation and making sense of the situation 
by describing, classifying visual, textual, and oral, 
information. 
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C. SECOND ORDER CATEGORY DISCUSSION  
1. Assessment―Separating a Complex Topic Into Smaller Parts to Gain 
a Better Understanding 
Decision makers were noted as dividing problems into component parts to first 
gain an understanding of what was occurring, and then seeking out the information still 
needed to make the decisions.  Using the Baltimore Tunnel Fire as an example, the fire 
chiefs needed to make a decision on evacuations.  To make this decision, they were noted 
as assessing the black smoke emanating from the tunnel and assessing the information 
contained in the train’s waybill; however, this was not enough information to make the 
decision; they turned to and listened to the advice of their hazardous materials 
firefighters.  Combined, this information provided a better understanding on the decision 
to evacuate.   
2. Comparative Evaluation―Continually Measuring Options Against 
the Current Information 
Certain decisions required the decision maker to contrast what they knew at that 
moment against the decision that was needed.  For instance, although faced with a fire 
storm that they had never before encountered, using what information they had just 
learned on the rate of the fire spreading, and what they could see as the fire approached, 
Sherriff Deputies made a decision to evacuate residents out of the fire’s path.  They were 
not trained firefighters, yet they continually weighed what they knew at that moment 
against what they were faced with to arrive at making a life-safety decision within a 
limited time period.   
3. Constraints/Limitations/Stress―Identifying Limitations and 
Constraints to Actions 
Not all decisions were made without encountering boundaries.  Limited 
information, time pressures, stress, limited experience, and knowledge were all factors 
which contributed to constraining or limiting decision-making.  Using the urgency to 
make life-safety decisions at the Pentagon on 9/11 as an example, the fire chiefs were 
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limited in their ability to gain situation awareness of the incident because the site itself 
was so large.  At the WTC incident, the fire chiefs attempting to make decisions on 
rescue operations were constrained by a lack of reliable intelligence.  In addition, due to 
the catastrophic conditions of the disaster the decision-making environment was stressful 
for the decision makers.   
4. Pre-arranged―Resorting to a Set of Predetermined Rules or 
Standards  
Some of the decisions appeared to require little thought.  There seemed to be a 
logical and systematic way of approaching the decision; almost that the decision did not 
require much thought.  For example, emergency managers faced with making the 
decision to evacuate at-risk residents from Hurricane Floyd resorted to decision-making 
based on a pre-determined set of plans.  Or, as in the decision to establish a command 
post inside the lobby of the World Trade Center, a fire chief resorted to a pre-established 
standard operating procedure.  In both of these situations there was a noticeable targeting 
or seeking of information via a predetermined set of rules to make decisions.  Other than 
remembering there was a plan or standard operating procedures to follow, there was little 
the decision maker had to do to arrive at a decision outcome.   
5. Predicative Estimations―Forecasting, Estimating, and Hypothesizing 
Attempting to foresee the outcome of the decisions was noted in some of the 
catastrophic disaster cases.  For instance, the fire chiefs’ decision to forego treating the 
severely injured and instead focus on viable patients at the Pentagon was a decision that 
required anticipating the most efficient use of the available resources.  From the 
Hurricane Floyd disaster case, attempting to predict what the decision outcome would be 
was not a direct decision-making function.  Rather, it appeared it was a trial and error 
approach in understanding the situation.  This was evident in that the emergency 
managers expected a specific number of people would evacuate when the orders were 
finally given.  Again, it was a process to evaluate through estimating what the decision 
outcome would result in.   
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6. Recognition—Remembering From Past Events or Practices, 
Assimilating to the Situation, Historical Reflection 
Being able to relate a past situation from experience to the current situation was a 
major factor leading up to making a decision.  During Hurricane Floyd emergency 
managers mentally recalled Hurricane Andrew as a past situation to the current situation 
of Hurricane Floyd on the decision to evacuate residents; however, the firefighters, chiefs 
and emergency medical technicians at the WTC incident had nothing to resort back to 
from their past experiences to make sense of the situation.   
7. Sense-making—Define the Situation and Make Sense of the Situation 
by Describing, Classifying Visual, Textual, and Oral Information 
The challenge to frame or place the decision into a category, either through 
reading something, visualization, hearing something appeared to be a significant factor in 
leading up to making a decision.  During the World Trade Center disaster, visualizing the 
scene to understand what had occurred, such as what the firefighters had to do when the 
towers collapsed to place the incident into a perspective, provided them with situation 
awareness of the destruction.  The fire chiefs in the San Diego fire storms gained 
situation awareness by listening to a report from someone with the most current 
knowledge on the spread of the fire.   
D. GROUNDED THEORY FINDINGS AND EMERGED THEMES  
Four influential second order categories that emerged from the catastrophic 
disaster cases were sense-making, recognition, assessment and pre-arranged.  These four 
categories did not occur at a higher incidence than the others of comparative evaluation, 
constraints/limitations/stress, or predicative estimations, rather they were found to be 
significant in making a decision during a catastrophic disaster.  However, limits such as 
experience of the decision maker and the quality of information from the disaster 
environment were found to have effects to sensemaking, recognition, assessment, and 
pre-arranged.   
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1. Sense-Making  
To illustrate how sense-making emerged as a decision-making finding, while 
responding to the Pentagon plane crash, a veteran chief of the fire department heard a 
vague report “that planes had crashed into the World Trade Center” (Varley, 2003, p. 
244).  This type of information would be one of the chief’s first steps in making sense of 
what he was responding into at the Pentagon.  To continue, upon arrival at the incident, 
the chief received information that “another hijacked plane was headed their way, there 
was an explosion at the White House, and that there was a car bomb at the State 
Department” (Varley, 2003, p. 245).  In addition, because of what he knew of two planes 
into the World Trade Center, “Schwartz thought they [the terrorists] could be planning a 
second strike on the Pentagon as well, with the intention of killing first responders” 
(Varley, 2003, p. 245).   
During this period, it was evident that from the disaster case research, the 
situation at the Pentagon was unfamiliar and the information from the environment was 
uncertain for making decisions.  Yet, life-safety decisions were still needed at “an 
incident the fire department had never before prepared for” (Varley, 2003, p. 246).  With 
the information about the World Trade Center incident in combination with the 
information he had learned about a plane headed to the Pentagon, and that he thought a 
second hijacked plane was headed to the Pentagon; the finding is that the chief was 
making sense of the situation.   
Sense-making through situation awareness continued based on what he could 
visualize such as the destruction to the Pentagon, and what he had heard from the other 
chiefs concerning rescue operations.  With little and uncertain information in this 
stressful circumstance, the chief’s decision-making did not become paralyzed.  He made 
enough sense of the situation to make the decision to evacuate first responders from the 
building to ensure their life-safety.   
This example illustrates that the chief, because he was faced with information 
limitations, was noted to be increasing sensemaking through an iterative situation 
awareness cycle to a sufficient point to make a decision.  It appears that in this 
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circumstance where situational awareness was low and high levels of uncertainty and 
equivocality existed, and there was an absence of recognition to make decisions, the 
process of increasing situation awareness by continually making sense of the situation 
contributed to decision-making.   
The finding then is that when information was low, and experience did not match 
the circumstance, repetitively building a story on information from the environment from 
what could be seen, heard, or read, enhanced the sense-making or situation awareness of 
the decision maker.  As a result of overcoming limitations by making complete sense of 
the situation, decisions on life-safety and scene operations were made as opposed to 
becoming paralyzed.  Sense-making also appeared to be a step towards categorizing the 
situation into something simple and manageable and assisted in building immediate 
experience (recognition) where none existed.   
2. Recognition  
The disaster cases researched were catastrophic which limited the ability to use 
the experience from past emergencies or disasters.  In the absence of mental recall, 
sensemaking materialized as a contributing factor towards building a conceptual theory 
on recognition.  This finding of recognition through sensemaking where no recall existed 
emerged from the Hurricane Floyd, 9/11 EMS, and San Diego Firestorm cases.   
Using the decision to use military aircraft during the San Diego Firestorm as a 
limit on recognition as an example, decision makers were unable to use mental recall at 
the onset of the disaster.  They were noted as saying “it was a decision never made before 
for an incident which decision makers had never experienced” (Lundberg, 2005, p. 322).  
At the onset of the firestorm, limited recognition caused decision-making boundaries; 
however, as learned from the disaster case, recognition accumulated over the two-week 
period of the disaster so that decisions toward the later part of the incident were made 
based on what was experienced during the early part of the disaster.  This example 
illustrates that the absence of recognition is a limitation that the decision maker 
eventually can overcome.   
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The finding is that to mitigate decision-making paralysis, no matter how 
inexperienced the decision maker may be, the environment is a source of information that 
can be used to develop experience.  In contrast, there were decisions that did not require a 
great deal of recognition; therefore, the pre-arranged category emerged whereby preset 
rules or standard were being used.   
3. Assessment  
Assessment from the research is described as separating a complex topic into 
smaller parts to gain a better understanding.  To simplify the second order category of 
assessment, Hurricane Floyd can be used as an example.  The emergency managers 
assessed a hurricane evacuation study (textual data) to determine roadway evacuation 
clearance times; this is data referencing.  They assessed the information they heard about 
the traffic on the evacuation routes and that it was becoming increasingly worse as the 
hurricane approached; this is hearing information.  They linked and compared the 
assessed data they had to what they had heard in order to make the next set of decisions 
on the evacuation.  In summary, they conducted an assessment of the textual data and 
what they heard to assist in making a decision on the evacuation.  They did not let the 
decision-making process become paralyzed.    
4. Pre-Arranged  
To illustrate from the 9/11 FDNY case, firefighters did not have to spend a large 
amount of time making a decision on who would be in command of the incident.  Due to 
training on standard operating procedures which outlined the incident command 
hierarchy, this type of decision required very little thought.  In this circumstance, and in 
other disaster cases where predetermined rules were used, the core category “pre-
arranged” emerged as another significant decision-making category.  As an additional 
example where “pre-arranged” emerged as a category, the emergency managers during 
Hurricane Floyd resorted to hurricane preplans and evacuation behavior studies to make 
the decision on evacuating the at-risk population.   
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The “pre-arranged” second order category emerged as a finding to build a 
conceptual theory that decision makers will resort to a prescriptive process if one is 
available rather than spend time trying to make sense of the situation or recall a past 
experience.   
E. CONCLUSION  
While conducting grounded theory research on the disaster cases it was unclear 
whether or not decision-making paralysis did occur.  It did become evident that decisions 
were made on life-safety issues and disaster operations; no matter the decision maker’s 
abilities or the disaster environment.  Although this finding discounts the problem 
statement that claims that emergency managers as decision makers will not be able to 
make decisions during a catastrophic disaster for a number of reasons and paralysis will 
be present, there still remained an uncertainty on how the decision makers made 
decisions.  However, as mentioned earlier, the disaster cases were selected because they 
were catastrophic disasters, not because they contained decision-making themes.  
Therefore, there was no clear evidence from the disaster cases that decision-making 
became paralyzed.  Still, there is a perception from the author’s 9/11 experience that 
decision-making paralysis can occur during catastrophic disasters.  This perception has 
prompted taking the findings from the disaster case research and conducting a second 
review of the literature; specifically to look into the function of the decision making 
environment and the abilities of decision maker as a way of mitigating decision-making 
paralysis.  The finding is that despite the experience level of the decision maker, and 
what little information the decision-making environment can provide, decision-making 
involves an iterative sensemaking cycle to build information and recognition.   
To review, from the author’s 9/11 experience, that during catastrophic disasters 
when situational awareness is low, when high levels of uncertainty and equivocality exist, 
and there is an absence of recognition to make decisions, decision-making can become 
paralyzed.  That in order to mitigate decision-making paralysis there needs to be a 
process of carrying out a sense-making and recognition cycle to build experience and 
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inform the decision maker—a cycle that continues until the decision maker obtains a 
reasonable or desired level of sense about the situation to make decisions.   
As mentioned in the literature review section, the existing decision-making 
research is absent in addressing decision-making paralysis; specifically during a 
catastrophic disaster.  In spite of this deficiency, the goal in linking the emerged findings 
to the normative and descriptive findings conducted by scholars in real-time (Klein), 
using past events (Weick), and by applying theory to a situation (Simon, March, 
Snowden) is to better understand if the findings that emerged from this study are in 
alignment with the decision-making research.  To achieve this requires revisiting and 
expanding on decision-making research topics such as satisficing, bounded rationality, 
heuristics, mental recall, and sensemaking and linking them to recognition, sensemaking, 
and pre-arranged found during the grounded theory research.  In addition, because the 
emergence of stress as a constraining and bounding factor surfaced across the second 
order categories of recognition, sensemaking, and pre-arranged, stress will be addressed 
as an inhibitor in decision-making under pressure caused by time pressures, uncertainties, 
or ill-defined goals.   
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V. LINKING THE EMERGED FINDINGS TO THE LITERATURE   
A. THE DECISION MAKER AND THE ENVIRONMENT  
Scholars such as Simon (1959, 1987, 1979, 1990) and March (1994) both suggest 
that decision makers have limits.  Open and analytical coding of the disaster cases 
revealed that decision makers were at times faced with limitations both in abilities and 
from the environment.  Regardless, the analysis revealed that decision makers still made 
decisions.  Understanding that decisions will and can still be made with limitations is 
further supported by the literature on satisficing and bounded rationality from Simon 
(1979).   
Simon (1979) has found from his research that decision makers will choose a 
solution that meets the minimum requirements or is good enough for the decision; what 
he calls “satisficing.”  Additionally, he claims that there are limits to an individuals 
decision-making abilities; which he terms as “bounded rationality.”  In a Harvard 
Business Review article on decision-making, the authors quote Simon on his bounded 
theory as saying “complex circumstances, limited time and inadequate mental 
computational powers reduce decision-making to a state of bounded rationality” 
(Buchanan & O’Connell, 2006).   
There are two factors being raised on the subject of limits that have also 
materialized from the grounded theory research.  The first is that the person(s) as a 
decision maker and his or her abilities are a factor in making decisions.  The second is 
that the decision-making environment also becomes a factor in making decisions.  Simon 
used a pair of scissors and a metaphor in his writing to describe the theory of what 
constitutes bounded rationality as a limitation. He explained, “One blade of the scissors is 
the cognitive abilities of the decision maker and the other is the structure of the 
environment” (Simon, 1990, p. 7).  This analogy helps in grounding the finding that there 
are limits to the decision maker’s (cognitive abilities) and limits to the decision-making 
environment; which March and Simon have declare in their research.   
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To illustrate the limitations point, decision makers during the 9/11 EMS 
operations were noted as being overwhelmed with high volumes of information thus 
limiting their ability to synthesize information (McKinsey Report, 2002).  In spit of limits 
in decision-making abilities and in information processing, they still made decisions.  
Furthermore, while reviewing the 9/11 FDNY disaster case on the decision to evacuate 
firefighters from the towers due to a possible collapse, the ability of the fire chiefs to 
make decisions when experience in this type of situation was low and information was 
scarce came to light as a limitation.  For instance, although 32 staff chiefs consisting of 
senior staff (McKinsey Report, 2002, p. 32) with years of experience were at the incident, 
they had had never been through a catastrophic incident such as two planes flying into 
two large buildings.  Additionally, the environment had communications and information 
sharing difficulties (McKinsey Report, 2002, p. 31).  Therefore, it can be implicit that the 
cognitive ability of the decision makers was not sufficient enough, and the environment 
was not conducive in gaining situation awareness.  Regardless, life-safety decisions were 
made based on limited experienced and limited information.   
To expand on decision-making limits further, from Simon (1959), bounded 
rationality means that the decision maker has a tendency to acquire manageable rather 
than optimal amounts of information, and that it is difficult for decision makers to 
identify all possible alternative solutions.  Simon does not imply that decision makers are 
irrational in their decision-making, rather that “decision makers are cognitively and 
informationally constrained so that an appreciation of what is happening may be partial 
and the ability to reason is generally good enough, not perfect” (1955, p. 113).  Along the 
same lines, March (1994) states that there is not always perfect and complete knowledge 
when making a decision, that there are “limitations to a decision maker’s attention, 
memory, and comprehension.” March continues that “people can make rational decisions 
if only they can gather enough information” (1994, p. 15).  March also provides insight 
into whether the information used in making decisions is sufficient or just suitable for 
making the decision.   
Recognizing that when limitations to recognition are present, making decisions 
does not necessarily require optimal information.  That using sufficient rather than 
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suitable information is a mitigation measure in avoiding decision-making paralysis.  In 
brief, when experience is absent and information scarce, a decision derived from the 
ability on-hand and the available information is better than no decision at all.   
B. DECISION-MAKING SHORTCUTS  
Linking Simon’s and March’s theories on satisficing and bounded rationality 
substantiates that decision-making can become paralyzed when situation awareness is 
low and there are high levels of uncertainty and equivocality.  To address constraints, 
such as limitations in mental recall, perhaps because there was nothing to recall or stress 
has inhibited the ability to recall, Simon’s research on “judgmental heuristics” is brought 
forward.  The literature on judgmental heuristics brings to light a finding that emerged 
from the grounded theory research, which is that decision makers seemed to approach 
some decisions by seeking out a predetermined rule or a standard operating procedure.  In 
doing so, the process of seeking out information for situation awareness was not needed.  
Heuristics as a decision-making concept requires some explanation.   
Judgmental heuristics is a concept that as decision makers build up experience or 
recognizable patterns, they use rules of thumb or shortcuts to reduce information 
processing demands (Simon, 1959).  Simon has contributed to the theory that experience 
and recognition is a vital component to decision-making.  He has coined the phrases, and 
later by expanded on by Tversky and Kahneman (1974), “availability heuristics”―a 
decision makers tendency to base decisions on information that is readily available in 
memory, and “representativeness heuristics”―a tendency to assess the likelihood of an 
event occurring based on impressions about similar occurrences (Tversky & Kahneman, 
1974).  Gigerenzer (1999) suggests that due to limited time and knowledge, cognitive 
biases do not have to get in the way of making decisions.  By mastering simple heuristics, 
an approach he calls “fast and frugal” reasoning, decision makers can make use of their 
rational decision-making (Gigerenzer & Todd, 1999).   
Using the pre-arranged category that emerged during the grounded theory 
research links to the heuristics findings mentioned above as a mitigation measure for 
avoiding decision-making paralysis.  For example the emergency managers during 
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Hurricane Floyd used hurricane preplans on evacuating the at-risk population, the fire 
chiefs at the Word Trade Center used standard operating procedures (rules of thumb or 
judgmental heuristics) to decide who would be in command of the incident, and the fire 
chiefs at the Baltimore Tunnel Fire used a department manual to determine the line-of-
succession to command the incident.  In addition, during the two-week San Diego 
Firestorm, decision makers built up and used recognizable patterns (representativeness 
heuristics) as they made decisions on fire fighting operations.   
The pre-arranged category emerged from the disaster cases as a finding that rules 
of thumb, or short cuts, can assist in reducing the information that needs to be processed 
when making a decision.  This finding is grounded in the literature on heuristics theories 
and therefore the use of heuristics can be considered a decision-making mitigation 
measure.   
C. STORY BUILDING 
A mental model is defined by Thompson, Jamieson, Hendy (1997, pp. 971–976) 
as:  
The knowledge necessary to perform a task may encompass past, present, 
and future [task] parameters, goals, and considerations.  Well-developed 
mental models are assumed to lead to more efficient information 
processing, to decreased time pressure and workload, and to better 
performance.   
The descriptive study of mental recall or recognition-primed decisions conducted 
by researchers such as Klein on firefighters and soldiers (1998) brings to light that skilled 
decision makers will use the first course of action they identify, and that they often rely 
on a story-building strategy to simulate the situation when making a decision.  In Klein’s 
study, where time pressures, uncertainty, ill-defined goals, and other complexities were 
factors, the subjects were observed using the first decision option they considered without 
comparing the option to anything else.   
Other scholars such as DeGroot (1965) on the game of chess and how moves are 
made based on visual memory and visual perception, Pennington and Hasite’s “story 
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model” (1993) on how jurors build a casual explanation out of information to collaborate 
a story to make decisions, and Klein and Crandall (1995) on how decision makers 
mentally simulate what their decision is to see if it will work; also through story building.  
In the context of this thesis, their research provides information that decision makers in 
stressful situations will find a way to make a decision by story-building.   
The disaster cases researched were catastrophic and, thereby, decision makers had 
little experience from the emergency or disasters they had responded to in the past to fall 
back on to make decisions.  However, rather than using no recall at all, decision makers 
used what limited experience they could.  The topic of story building can be linked to the 
category.  Recognition which emerged from the grounded theory.   
The link to the findings by decision-making scholars mentioned above and the 
findings that emerged from grounded theory are that decision makers in the catastrophic 
disaster cases, even when no mental recall was available, still managed to make 
decisions.  This affirms the finding that in the absence of information and memory recall, 
decision-making can still take place by first making sense of the situation by gaining 
awareness through an iterative information gaining cycle of reading, visualizing, and or 
listening to the environment until the decision can be made.  For instance, returning to the 
Baltimore Tunnel Fire where decision makers were dealing with a situation that had no 
parallels in their collective experience, they built a story of the situation by continually 
seeking out information.  With no mental recall or recognition available, they built a story 
through sense-making by reading the way-bill of the train’s content, observing the smoke 
from the tunnel, and listening to their hazardous materials team for their opinion on what 
could happen if their was an explosion.  In summary, they made decisions based on 
existing conditions without comparing their options to anything else except from the 
information they were building upon from the environment.  
Therefore, story-building as a strategy can be considered a mitigation measure for 
decision-making paralysis.   
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D. SENSE-MAKING 
According to Drucker, “The effective decision maker always tests for signs that 
something is atypical or something unusual is happening” (1967, p. 94).  A similar theory 
found in Drucker’s statement emerged as a finding in the grounded theory research.  For 
example, Drucker’s statement linked to the research findings of sense-making, where 
decision makers were found to be making sense of the situation in order to make 
decisions, it becomes apparent that there exists a step of “testing” or checking the 
decision-making environment for “something happening.”  Testing for something 
happening in this context is a step in assessing or measuring the decision-making 
environment leading towards making a decision.  In further examining other scholarly 
works, Klein’s (1998) research on his RPD model accounts for a decision-making step 
which he calls sense-making.  As noted in his writings on RPD, “it [RPD] fuses two 
processes: the way decision makers size up the situation to recognize which course of 
action makes sense, and the way they evaluate that course of action by imagining it” 
(Klein, 1998, p. 24).  In combination with Drucker’s and Klein’s sense-making notions, 
and the finding from the grounded theory research, a theoretical framework is established 
that a step in making a decision, when situational awareness is low, high levels of 
uncertainty and equivocality exist, and there is an absence of recognition to make 
decisions, is to make sense of the situation by organizing what is known as a way of 
placing the situation into some form of order.   
Reviewing additional scholarly articles written on the topic of sense-making and 
using the findings from the grounded theory research begins to build the foundation into 
how decision information can be categorized.  To articulate the essential processes 
involved in sense-making, and bring the concept of organizing or categorizing a situation 
through sensemaking into perspective, requires turning to the studies of organizational 
theory.   
Weick and Sutcliffe (2005), for example, have studied how people organize a 
situation by “labeling and categorizing issues to make sense of equivocal inputs and enact 
this sense back to make order of the situation” (2005, p 409).  To expand on the finding 
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of sense-making further, recall from the literature review section that David Snowden has 
studied the act of sensemaking by developing a model called Cynefin (Snowden, 1999).  
Developed as a tool to categorize a situation, the Cynefin model illustrates the way a 
person can frame or places the situation and information into one of five areas of simple, 
complicated, complex, chaotic, or disorder (Snowden, 1999).   
Linking what emerged from the research on the Pentagon disaster case illustrates 
that the fire chief as the decision maker was noted as continually obtaining situation 
awareness or making sense of the circumstance by seeing and hearing information to 
make decisions.  In linking this finding to the scholarly research, the chief appeared to 
categorize and store the obtained information on the plane into the World Trade Center 
and the possibility of another plane headed to the Pentagon.  There was no evidence from 
the catastrophic disaster case research that the decision-making stalled.  The process of 
categorizing and storing the information enabled the chief to make a decision to evacuate 
the Pentagon.  Therefore, the act of categorizing information and circumstances found in 
doing ground theory research is a process that has been observed by scholars on subjects 
as they label and categorize the situation to make sense.   
E. STRESS AS A DECISION-MAKING FACTOR  
The subject of stress became an overarching category throughout all the second 
order categories; specifically within the constraints, boundaries, and stress second order 
category.  To affirm that stress is an influencer to the decision maker requires turning to 
the literature on stress; specifically findings on stress during disaster operations.   
In a paper on the sources of stress to emergency managers, Paton and Flin (1999) 
state, “Stress adversely affects performance in circumstances that demand high levels of 
attention and creative solutions to emergency problems” (p. 262).  In 2000, a study 
conducted by the Defense and Civil Institute of Environmental Medicine investigated the 
effectiveness of experiential cross-training in a team context for team decision-making 
under time stress in a simulated naval surveillance task (McCann, Baranski, Thompson, 
& Pigeau, 2000).  The decision-making premise used in this study resembles that of what 
could transpire during a catastrophic disaster.  For example, similar to military missions, 
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catastrophic disaster operations takes place in environments where uncertain information 
resides, there are time constraints, can involve high stakes, and must often be 
accomplished under conditions of mental fatigue and high workload.  The number and 
magnitude of these constraints can undermine decision-making (McCan et al., p. 1095).  
In doing further research on what could cause stress or influence decision-making, 
Zsambok and Klein have written in a book on naturalistic decision-making: “The 
identification of key contextual factors that affect the way real-world decision-making 
occurs, in contrast to their counterparts in the traditional decision research paradigm 
evolved as a major contribution of the 1989 NDM [Naturalistic Decision-making] 
conference (Orasanu & Connolly, 1993). They are:  
 Ill-structured problems (not artificial, well-structured problems).  
 Uncertain, dynamic environments (not static, simulated situations).  
 Shifting, ill-defined, competing goals (not clear and stable goals).  
 Action/feedback loops (no one-shot decisions).  
 Time stress (as opposed to ample time for tasks).  
 High stakes (not situations devoid of true consequences for the decision 
maker).  
 Multiple players (as opposed to individual decision-making).   
 Organizational goals and norms (as opposed to decision-making in a 
vacuum)” (Zsambok & Klein, 1997, p. 5).   
Along with lack of experience and little knowledge in managing catastrophes, 
factors such as the above can contribute to paralyzing the decision-making process.  As 
seen with the September 11 terrorist attacks, the nature of a catastrophic disaster creates 
chaos for both the communities impacted, but also the emergency managers who can 
become confused and disorganized (Drabek, 2003).   
In reviewing literature on stress, it becomes apparent that stresses such as anxiety 
or fear are influences that an individual encounters that can affect their decision-making 
performance.  As mentioned in a paper on stress in leadership, “Stress in the form of 
anxiety about the situation and fear in making a decision reduces the decision maker’s 
performance; which results in a condition where decision-making becomes paralyzed” 
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(Kapucu & Van Wart, 2008).  While it was not obvious that any of the decision makers in 
the catastrophic disaster cases feared making a decision, it can be speculated that because 
the decision makers were managing extraordinary levels of disruption, they could have 
been experiencing stress because of disagreements or difficulties in obtaining information 
to make decisions.   
This was the situation at the Baltimore Tunnel Fire when fire chiefs had to search 
for information and the Mayor’s Office did not agree on evacuation operations.  Stress 
also emerged as a category from the Hurricane Floyd disaster case.  Emergency managers 
were frustrated that the evacuation order could not be issued until a government 
executive order was issued.  It should be noted that there were limited accounts of stress 
in the disaster cases; however, it is such an important topic to consider as a mitigation 
measure that it deserves further attention.   
As remarked in the Hurricane Katrina Report, a disaster at this level contains 
situations at extraordinary levels that are wrought with stressors that can affect the 
emergency manager’s decision-making abilities (HR, 2006).  Even an emergency or 
routine disaster has shown to result in stress.  For example, in a paper on stress responses 
of emergency services personnel to the Loma Prieta Earthquake (Marmar et al., 1996, p. 
65), the authors site a study of stress to emergency responders.  In this case, 79 rescue, 
fire, and medical personnel as well as police officers who responded to victims of an 
apartment building explosion were observed (Durham, McCammon, & Allison, 1985).  
“They reported a high prevalence of intrusive thoughts in those working with or 
searching for victims at the disaster site.  In this study they concluded that “emergency 
workers responding to contained small-scale disasters are likely to experience milder 
stress symptoms” (Durham, McCammon, and Allison, 1985).  In further linking stress to 
the research on catastrophic disasters, such as that conducted by Thomas Drabek (2003), 
he has concluded that these types of disasters (catastrophic) contain many stressors.  
Drabek notes that a catastrophic disaster will cause confusion and disorganization for the 
emergency manager at a level never before encountered.  From Drabek’s study on 
disasters (2003) and Paton and Flin’s (1999) statement on the affects of stress, it is 
theorized that during a catastrophic disaster if our brain is allowed to process information 
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without any outside influences or distractions, the chances of making good decisions 
could increase.  There are, however, arguments that stress is not a factor in decision-
making; in fact it may be an asset.   
In a paper on high stake decision-making (Kunreuther, Meyer, Zeckhauser, et al., 
2002, p. 262), “A large number of empirical studies find that enhanced stress focuses 
decision makers on a selective set of cues when evaluating options (e.g., Kahn & Baron 
1995; Ben Zur & Bernitz 1981; Kahn & Luce 2001) and leads them to make greater use 
of simplifying heuristics (e.g. Luce, Bettman, & Payne, 1997).”  Gary Klein (1998, p. 
275) claims “that stress does affect the way we process information, but it does not cause 
us to make bad decisions based on the information at hand.”  In other words, it is not the 
individual experiencing stress that causes ineffective decision-making; rather, it is 
disturbances or information intrusions that cause ineffective decision making.   
Klein’s case studies on first responders in stressful situations showed that 
“extreme time pressure, high stakes, and ambiguity” had no influence on decision-
making (Klein, 1998, p. 275).  As noted by Kowolski-Trakofler, and Vaught (2003, p.4) 
“for some individuals heightened stress elevates their performance.  In addition, on the 
issue where experience is a factor in reducing stress, Paton and Flin (1999) noted that 
“emergency managers may have built up experience and have become resilient in 
managing emergencies or routine disasters” (p.264).   
In summary, from the literature reviewed on stress and stress during a disaster, 
there are positions taken that stress influences the decision maker’s performance (Kapucu 
& Van Wart, 2008), stress has no influences on the decision maker’s performance (Klein, 
1998), stress can assist the decision maker in focusing in on a decision (Kunreuther et al, 
2002), and that stress elevates the use of intuition of the decision maker (Kowolski-
Trakofler et al., 2003).  In addition, the decision-making environment can influence the 
decision maker’s abilities.  The environment, because it is filled with uncertainties, can 
cause instability in gaining situation awareness; thus creating stress; however, stress, if 
minimized but not totally eliminated, could serve as an enhancer to decision-making.  
Meaning, if the decision maker’s stress level is maintained at a perceptive level, decision-
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making will not become paralyzed.  Therefore, overlooking stress as an influencer would 
detract from building a catastrophic disaster descriptive decision process model.   
F. CONCLUSION  
By linking the decision-making findings that emerged from the grounded theory 
research to several decision-making scholarly sources, it is now realized that due stress, 
and a decision-making environment that may not hold all the information, there are limits 
to decision-making.  Some decision makers were noted to overcome these limits by 
resorting to shortcuts, others were found to build a story in a sensemaking step.  
Regardless, decision makers will make a decision based on their abilities and what 
information is known at the time, not necessarily what is available or what the 
environment is capable of producing.  It is therefore necessary to prompt the decision 
maker to enhance their abilities by seeking information from the environment so that a 
desired decision-making state is achieved where decisions are being made, not 
developing into a paralyzed state.   
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VI. NEW PROCESS MODEL DEVELOPMENT  
A. TURNING THE FINDINGS INTO A DESCRIPTIVE DECISION 
PROCESS MODEL  
By linking the findings of the second order categories of assessment, comparative 
evaluation, constraints/limitations/stress, pre-arranged, predictive estimations, 
recognition, and sense-making from the grounded theory research to the decision-making 
literature, a descriptive decision process model has emerged that comprises the decision-
making environment and involves the decision maker.  The concept that emerged from 
the research findings is that when the decision-making environment has high levels of 
uncertainty and equivocality, and the decision maker’s abilities and situational awareness 
are low, decision-making paralysis could occur.  Decision-making paralysis is a condition 
where the decision maker is not making decisions on life safety and important emergency 
management operations.  Therefore, mitigating decision-making paralysis resides in 
forming recognizable patterns through and iterative cycle of building ability and 
information from the decision-making environment.  In other words, decision-making 
paralysis can be mitigated by building a story from the environment to enhance situation 
awareness, and as a result, improve decision-making abilities.  A consideration in 
realizing this idea is that the decision maker, because of little or no catastrophic disaster 
experience, has minimal recall if any at all and that the decision-making environment 
contains the information needed for story building, which leads to decision-making.   
To illustrate, Figure 1 depicts high levels of uncertainty and equivocality on the Y 
axis, and low abilities and situational awareness on the X axis.  The space contained 
within the two lines represents the decision-making environment.  The point at which the 
two lines over time approach each other, yet do not intersect, symbolizes decision-
making paralysis.  Figure 2, on the other hand, demonstrates the proposed idea in 
mitigating decision-making paralysis.  In this diagram, the two lines are quickly narrowed 
and intersect representing the decision-making point.  To get the lines to intersect and 
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thereby mitigating decision-making paralysis calls for using the environment to form 
recognizable patters through an iterative information and ability-building cycle.   
 
 
Figure 2.   Decision-Making Paralysis  
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Figure 3.   Decision-Making Paralysis Mitigated  
B. FOUR DECISION PROCESS MODELS  
As found during the grounded theory research and confirmed in the literature 
review, decision-making is a dynamic process of searching for past experiences and 
information to connect to the current situation.  Or, if unable to drawn upon past 
experiences, “using a process of learning, understanding, information processing, 
assessing, and defining the problem and its circumstances can be used to make decisions” 
(Zeleny, 1982, p. 86).  With this in mind, to mitigate decision-making paralysis and make 
decisions during a catastrophic disaster, emergency managers need a fast, flexible 
decision-making process; a process that involves a way to increase decision-making 
abilities.  Rather, than designing a decision-making process model from the ground up, 
several researched and tested models and processes are sought out for relevance.   
However, there are a number of decision theories available from the research 
fields of cognitive science, social science, decision science, and organization studies to 
choose from in developing the new process.  These theories have been developed into 
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decision-making models and processes by researchers for specific purposes, such as 
public choice theory (Buchanan & Tullock, 1962) for political science applications in 
understanding how people vote, and game theory (Luce & Raiffi, 1957), which is a 
concept of studying rational behavior of individuals in situations involving struggle, 
outguessing, and bargaining (Simon, 1959, p. 266).  Therefore, to select the most relevant 
models and theories so that a new process model can be developed necessitates resorting 
back to the second order categories of assessment, comparative evaluation, 
constraints/limitations/stress, pre-arranged, predictive estimations, recognition, and 
sense-making found during the grounded theory research.  Although several existing 
decision models were reviewed, such as avoidance, adaptive, and decisive, they were not 
applicable to mitigating decision making paralysis; however, there are four models found 
to contain aspects of the second order categories.  The four models are Drucker’s 
business model, the military decision making model, the observe, orient, decide, act loop, 
and recognition-primed decision making.   
To evaluate the selected models, the second order categories mentioned above, 
and the author’s 9/11 decision-making experience are used to put each of the four models 
in action.  Lastly, the new descriptive decision process model developed leveraging the 
four selected models is also put in action.   
1. Drucker’s Business Model 
From the normative research conducted on business decisions, Drucker’s business 
model (1967) is found to be a short prescriptive sequence of decision-making steps.  In 
other words, this model suggests several short steps to follow in order to make decisions.  
The following are the steps in Drucker’s model along with a brief explanation (in italics) 
provided by Drucker (1967):  
1. The classification of the problem.   
Is it generic? Is it exceptional and unique?  Or is it the first manifestation of a 




2. The definition of the problem.  What are we dealing with? 
The specifications which the answer to the problem must satisfy?  What are the 
boundary conditions? 
3. The decision as to what is “right” rather than what is acceptable, in order to meet 
the boundary conditions.   
What will fully satisfy the specifications before attention is given to the 
compromises, adaptations, and concessions, needed to make the decisions 
applicable? 
4. The building into the decision of the action to carry it out.   
What does the action commitment have to be?  Who has to know about it? 
5. The feedback which tests the validity and effectiveness of the decision against the 
actual course of events.   
How is the decision being carried out?  Are the assumptions on which it is based 
appropriate or obsolete?  (Drucker, 1967, p. 92). 
a. Evaluating Drucker’s Business Model  
Using the second order categories, Drucker’s business model is evaluated 
to demonstrate relevance in mitigating decision-making paralysis.    
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Table 2.   Drucker’s Model Evaluated Against the Second Order Categories 
Using the decision of where emergency management vehicles would be 
safely staged at the WTC disaster to illustrate the second order categories and the 
concepts of Drucker’s model, the steps are put into action.   
Second Order Category Evaluation 
Assessment  
Separating a complex topic into 
smaller parts to gain a better 
understanding. 
The short and easy to understand steps of the model 
enables the decision-maker to break down the 
decision topic into smaller parts as a way of gaining 
a better understanding of the decision.  
Comparative Evaluation 
Continually measuring options 
against the current information. 
Step 6 contains a “feedback” step which promotes 
evaluation of the decision, or the steps leading up to 
the decision, “against the actual course of events”.  
Constraints/Limitations/Stress 
Identifying limitations and 
constraints to actions.   
Step 3 asks about the specifications that must be 
satisfied.  This step helps bring out exactly what 
information needs to be considered as part of the 
decision and if that information creates boundaries 
in making the decision.   
Pre-arranged  
Resorting to a set of 
predetermined rules or standards. 
Step 1 is about classifying the problem.  This 
particular step is useful in determining if there is an 
existing rule that can be referenced.    
Predictive Estimations 
Forecasting, estimating, and 
hypothesizing. 
Step 4 requires the decision maker to consider from 
the decision-making environment what will work.  
In other words, there is relevant and irrelevant 
information.  This step prompts the decision maker 
to evaluate what the “right” information is to make 
the decision; rather than what is “acceptable”.  Step 
5 is also assists by considering the actions being 
carried out by the decision.  Forecasting, or thinking 
ahead, is a valuable decision-making step.   
Recognition  
Remembering from past events or 
past practices, assimilating to the 
situation, historical reflection. 
Although there may not be anything to recall on, 
Step 2 is an effective starting point in asking “what 
are we dealing with”.   
Sense-making  
Define the situation and making 
sense of the situation by 
describing, classifying visual, 
textual, and oral, information. 
Combined, Step 1 and Step 2 prompt the decision 
maker to frame the situation as a way of making 
sense.   
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Table 3.   Drucker’s Model Put into Action  
Decision Step Second Order Categories Evaluation 
1. The 
classification of 
the problem.   
Assessment, Pre-Arranged, 
Sense-making 
The decision as to where a staging 
location should be located is a 
general decision containing 
smaller decisions. By beginning 
the process with a step of 
classifying the problem, this step 
would have lead to separate 
decisions such as is the area large 
enough and is it accessible.  This 
step would also assist in 
identifying if there are existing 
procedures or protocols for the 
location for emergency vehicles to 
stage, such as a parking lot or on a 
street.  In fact there were standard 
operating procedures in place.  
This was a decision the author 
made many times before using the 
procedure and is considered a 
standard practice at any large-
scale emergency or disaster.  This 
classification step is also a step in 
making sense of the situation 
because it compels the decision 
maker to examine the decision-
making environment for the 
needed information.   
 
2. The definition 
of the problem.   
Comparative Evaluation, 
Sense-making  
Defining the problem would have 
revealed several essential factors 
in selecting a safe staging location 
such as a location that would be 
easily accessible and had ample 
space for the vehicles.  The 
process of defining can also be 
considered a step which requires 
measuring options; such as 
comparing the advantages of 
using another staging location to 
the current location being 
selected.   
 
By evaluating and comparing the 
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different staging locations, this 
step is also a contributing piece in 
making sense of the situation 
which leads to building a story 




answer to the 
problem must 
satisfy?   
Constraints/Limitation/Stress, 
Predictive Estimations  
This step would have framed the 
decision by asking if the staging 
area needed to have an access and 
egress route, large enough to hold 
all the vehicles, and close enough 
to the WTC area yet a safe 
distance away.  By framing, this 
step helps in controlling the 
information the decision maker 
needs to obtain for the decision.  
This step also makes the decision 
maker consider the outcomes of 
the decision.  
4. The decision as 
to what is 
“right” rather 
than what is 
acceptable, in 
order to meet 
the boundary 
conditions.   
Constraints/Limitation/Stress Selecting a safe staging location 
was a “wicked” problem.  There 
were a limited number of 
locations that could be used.  
Using this particular step would 
have helped in recognizing that 
choosing one location could effect 
some other emergency 
management operation such as a 
command post location or a triage 
and treatment location.  Not 
selecting the best suited or the 
right staging area would result in 
another decision at a later time to 
correct the first decision.  This 
step prompts the decision-maker 
to search the decision-making 
environment for the correct 
information to make the decision.  
5. The building 
into the 
decision of the 
action to carry 
it out. 
Comparative Evaluation,  
Predictive Estimations 
By measuring the commitment of 
the decision against information 
leading to the decision, this step 
would assist in determining the 
issues required to implement the 
decision.  In other words, this step 
prompts the decision maker to 
consider what the effects of the 
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decision will be.   
Using this step would have been 
helpful in raising the need to let 
the response vehicles drivers 
know where the staging location 
was to be established.  This action 
would have stimulated the process 
of hypothesizing or thinking 
ahead the effectiveness of the 
staging location.   
6. The feedback 









Comparative Evaluation  Because of the towers collapsing, 
the decision was never made 
therefore the decision never 
reached this point.  However if the 
decision was made, the 
effectiveness would have been 
evaluated by how many of the 
first responders found the area to 
get to, utilized the staging area for 
their vehicles, and was large 
enough to hold the vehicles.   
b. Drucker’s Business Model Strengths and Weaknesses  
In Step 4, “The decision as to what is ‘right’ rather than what is 
acceptable, in order to meet the boundary conditions” contains a very good and useful 
concept (Drucker, 1967, p. 96).  Here, the decision-maker is prompted to consider what is 
right and what is wrong for the boundary conditions in making the decision (Drucker, 
1967, p. 96) and only express what is right in making the decision.  In other words, the 
decision-maker should not use irrelevant information and make a decision for the sake of 
just making a decision.  The decision should be made based on what will provide the 
proper solution to the problem.  This step also seems to link to Simon’s “satisficing” 
finding that decision makers have a tendency to acquire manageable rather than optimal 
amounts of information (1959).  The requirement in Step 4 solicits information that if it is 
not available, then the decision maker needs to obtain the information before advancing 
to the next step.   
In general, this concept can be interpreted into terms that decision-making 
can be made with limited information; granted the information is within the scope of the 
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problem.  Meaning the information gained needs to be linked to problem being solved.  
To illustrate, a decision on evacuation will have information on the number of evacuees 
and shelter capacity.  The evacuation decision cannot be expected to have effective 
results if the information is obtained from something unrelated such as the decision on 
selecting a location for command post operations.   
Because the concept of using relevant information to make the right 
decision has value, it is used in both the information building and sense-making cycle and 
the ability building cycle of the descriptive decision process model being proposed.  For 
example, the information and ability is built upon by using the decision-making 
environment and using what is relevant from the decision maker’s recognition or training 
related to past emergencies or disasters.  The decision-maker can make the decision when 
a desired state is achieved; however, the information obtained and the ability built must 
come from within the decision-making environment and from within the decision 
maker’s capabilities.  Although this particular concept is useful, there are others that are 
not.    
Drucker’s step process may be of use to the business executive in a setting 
where time is not a factor and information, if not readily available, can be obtained.  
However, this process may not be entirely effective in a situation the thesis is addressing, 
which is decision-making paralysis during catastrophic disasters where wicked problems 
exist.  For example, several of the catastrophic disaster cases studied and the decisions I 
made at the WTC centered on the life-safety of first responders and the public.  As a 
result of any decision with life-safety at stake, time was of the essence.  Decision makers 
using Drucker’s suggested steps in a catastrophic disaster could find that their decision-
making process becomes paralyzed and have negative results.   
2. Military Decision Making Model: MDMP  
In an opposing setting to the business environment, The Army Planning and 
Orders Production Field Manual 5-0, (Department of the Army, 2010) describes the 
decision-making model of the Army’s military decision-making process (MDMP).  
MDMP (Figure 3) is a systematic process designed for military commanders in a “time-
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constrained environment to organize their planning activities, share a common 
understanding of the mission and commander’s intent, and develop effective plans and 
orders” (Department of the Army, 2010, p. 3-1).  In viewing this model from a decision-
making perspective rather than as a planning tool, MDMP is a ridged and succinct 
methodical process with each step having a definitive outcome before moving onto the 
next.  Taken as a whole, MDMP illustrates how the process of memorizing a 
predetermined set of rules or standards for recall during a catastrophic disaster can be 
used to make decisions.   
Using the second order categories, the MDMP is evaluated to demonstrate 













Table 4.   MDMP Evaluated Against the Second Order Categories  
a. Evaluating MDMP  
Using the decision to evacuate personnel from the EOC to illustrate the 
second order categories and the concepts of the MDMP model, the steps are put into 





Second Order Category Evaluation 
Assessment  
Separating a complex topic into 
smaller parts to gain a better 
understanding. 
There are separate yet connected steps in MDMP 
that assist the decision maker in dividing the 
decision into separate components.  This enables the 
decision maker to understand the decision being 
made.  
Comparative Evaluation 
Continually measuring options 
against the current information. 
Step 5 is helpful in evaluating if the current COA is 
of use by comparing it to the current or other 
COA’s.  
Constraints/Limitations/Stress 
Identifying limitations and 
constraints to actions.   
In Step 2, the decision maker goes through an 
analysis process of identifying what will limit or 
constrain the decision.   
Pre-arranged  
Resorting to a set of 
predetermined rules or standards. 
By developing COA in Step 3, the decision maker is 
building rules or standards.    
Predictive Estimations 
Forecasting, estimating, and 
hypothesizing.  
By going through an analysis process of the COA, 
Step 4 encourages forecasting what the effects of the 
COA could be.   
Recognition  
Remembering from past events or 
past practices, assimilating to the 
situation, historical reflection. 
Step 2 is a mission analysis step which appears to 
stimulate the decision maker into considering if 
there were any past situations that could be linked to 
the current decision.  
Sense-making  
Define the situation and making 
sense of the situation by 
describing, classifying visual, 
textual, and oral, information. 
The analysis component of Step 2 also contains a 
step to assist in making sense of the situation.  This 
is found to be a comprehensive step that prompts the 
decision maker to scan the decision-making 
environment for relevant information.   
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Table 5.   MDMP Put Into Action 
Decision Step Second Order Categories Evaluation 
1. Receipt of 
Mission 
Assessment  This step would have helped in 
determining exactly the topic of the 
decision.  In this case, should the OEM 
staff in the EOC be activated or not? 
2. Mission Analysis Assessment  By analyzing the mission, this step 
would be helpful to determine that 
evacuating the OEM staff required 
weighing the advantages against the 
disadvantages of losing the use of the 
EOC.  
3. Course of action 
(COA) 
Development 
Predictive Estimations  This step would clarify what would be 
needed to effectuate the evacuation 
process, who would be involved (both 
as evacuees and evacuation 
coordinators), and the duration of the 
evacuation to get everyone safely out. 
4. COA Analysis Comparative Evaluation  This analysis step becomes an overall 
asset in making the decision.  It would 
have assisted in evaluating the 
effectiveness of the evacuation such as 
by assessing what was used and what 
was still needed to complete the 
evacuation, if all OEM staff were 
evacuated and if additional or less 
evacuation coordinators were required, 
and if the evacuation was proceeding at 
the expected time allotment.    
5. COA Comparison Comparative Evaluation  This step would have lead to evaluating 
if the COA implementation could be 
improved by using another COA.   
6. COA Approval Constraints/Limitations/Stress Considering the decision to evacuate 
the EOC was a significant decision to 
emergency management operations, 
this step would have suggested that 
getting approval from senior OEM staff 
would be a prudent measure.  However, 
this step could limit the decision 
making.  
7. Orders Production  
(Department of the 
Army, 2010) 
Constraints/Limitations/Stress The step of developing a plan for the 
decision to evacuate the EOC in this 
circumstance was not needed. 




b. Military Decision Making Model Strengths and Weaknesses   
MDMP consists of a predetermined step-by-step approach in making a 
decision.  This analytical process may appear tedious; however it can be viewed as an 
asset for mitigating decision-making paralysis.  For example, by resorting to a process 
containing prompts such as receipt of mission, mission analysis, COA development, etc., 
the decision-maker is guided through a progression of steps leading to decision 
(Department of the Army, 2010, p. 3-43).  The concept of stepping through a decision 
emerged from several of the disaster case studies as the second order category pre-
arranged and was noted as to be resorting to a set of predetermined rules or standards.  A 
strong point of MDMP that can be leveraged is that the model itself can be viewed as a 
set of predetermined rules or standards used in making a decision.   
To illustrate, there was a set of predetermined rules or standard operating 
procedures (SOP) noted to have been used in the 9/11 EMS disaster case (McKinsey 
Company, 2002).  The SOP was resorted to in making a decision on which ambulance 
units to respond to the WTC.  Similar to MDMP, the EMS SOP is somewhat of a step 
through checklist.  The decision maker did not need to consider where the ambulances 
would come from or how many would be needed.  By simply following an SOP that in 
general asked the location of the incident, how many patients, and how many are critical, 
a story of the situation was being built.  In addition, the advantage in following an 
analytical process such as this is that the decision maker is engaged in a cycle of 
repeatedly analyzing the environment in a way that the decision maker’s ability begins to 
increase.  The cycle of story building and ability building, therefore, informs the 
decision-making process as it advances to ensure the outcome will be correct, thus 
ultimately leading to decisions rather than no decisions at all.   
MDMP is described as “a planning model that establishes procedures for 
analyzing a mission, developing, analyzing, and comparing courses of action against 
criteria of success and each other, selecting the optimum course of action, and producing 
a plan or order” (Department of the Army, 2010, p. 3-1).  Although effective in cases 
where time is not an issue, when decisions must be made quickly however the analytical 
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process of MDMP is not optimal for use during a catastrophic disaster.  Researchers have 
commented that “the time expended during sophisticated simulation, analysis, and 
comparison of the options increases as the number of potential courses of action 
increases” (Van Riper& Hoffman, 1998, pp. 7–8).  For example, from the MDMP, taking 
time during a catastrophic disaster to analyze what the mission is will not provide any 
advantages, and comparing the concepts of how the decision will be put into operations 
and producing orders could potentially paralyze the decision-making process.  As a 
result, when the solution to the decision is finally arrived at, it is obsolete.  The solution 
to avoiding a time consuming process is to refine and limit what is being consider in the 
model.   
3. Observe, Orient, Decide, Act Loop: OODA LOOP 
In an analysis on how American fighter pilots made decisions while in the 
stressful environment of combat, U.S. Air Force Pilot John Boyd developed observe-
orient-decide-act loop (Boyd, 1987).  The OODA loop (Figure 4) is a model that 
describes a thought process used in the deciding and acting stages of decision-making.  
The activities in the model consist of observing the environment, orienting oneself for the 
next stage of deciding what to do next, and ending with an act which involves 
implementing the decision.  Based on what emerged during the grounded theory research, 
OODA loop contains the second order category of sense-making in the observe and 
orient stages.   
 
Figure 4.   Observe, Orient, Decide, Act Loop (From Boyd, 1987) 
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Using the second order categories, the OODA loop is evaluated to demonstrate 
relevance in mitigating decision making paralysis.    
Table 6.   OODA Loop Evaluated Against the Second Order Categories  
a. Evaluating OODA Loop  
Using the decision to move the EMS crews setting up a triage and 
transportation operation in an area where there was falling debris to illustrate the second 
order categories and the concepts of OODA loop, the steps are put into action.  
Second Order Category Evaluation 
Assessment  
Separating a complex topic into 
smaller parts to gain a better 
understanding. 
OODA loop was selected as a model because like 
Drucker’s business steps and the steps in MDMP, 
it allows the decision maker to separate the 
decision into smaller parts in order to gain an 
understanding.   
Comparative Evaluation 
Continually measuring options 
against the current information. 
The step of orienting is an activity that leads to 
evaluating and measuring what is known against 
the decision-making environment.  
Constraints/Limitations/Stress 
Identifying limitations and 
constraints to actions.   
In the observing step the decision maker has the 
opportunity to identify any limits or constraints in 
making the decision.    
Pre-arranged  
Resorting to a set of predetermined 
rules or standards. 
Although there is no definitive step that calls for 
resorting to predetermined rules that step of orient 
can be used to ascertain whether there are pre-
arranged protocols that can be used in making the 
decision.   
Predictive Estimations 
Forecasting, estimating, and 
hypothesizing.  
The decide step is where the decision maker can 
initiate what the decision outcomes could be.   
Recognition  
Remembering from past events or 
past practices, assimilating to the 
situation, historical reflection. 
The orient step is a step that the decision maker 
can use to recall on past events.   
Sense-making  
Define the situation and making 
sense of the situation by describing, 
classifying visual, textual, and oral, 
information. 
The observe step is where the decision maker can 
scan the decision-making environment for 
information to enhance situation awareness for 
sense-making.   
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Table 7.   Putting OODA Loop Into Action 
Decision Step Second Order Categories Evaluation 
1. Observe  Assessment/Sense-making  By engaging in the observation 
step, the EMS crews would have 
been noticed working in an area 
that became quickly dangerous 
because of falling debris from the 
towers.  The observation step is 
important in understanding what is 
occurring in the environment.  In 
this particular situation, the 
environment would have been 
separated into smaller parts by 
accessing where the EMS crew was 
positioned, where the debris was 
falling, and where an alternative 
safe place would be.  
2. Orient  Sense-making  By becoming oriented with the 
decision-making environment, it 
would have become evident that 
because of the falling debris, 
allowing an EMS crew to set up the 
triage and treatment area anywhere 
in the vicinity of the towers was 
not an efficient decision.  
3. Decide  Comparative Evaluation   Although an obvious step, the 
simple step of Decide prompts the 
decision maker to consider 
implementing the decision against 
not making a decision.  In this case, 
Decide was a step that included 
instructing the EMS crew to move 
to another location. 
4. Act  Predictive Estimations  The act step is where the decision 
is thought about, where options are 
weighed prior to implementing; 
which in this case resulted in the 
EMS crews moving to another 
location.2 
 
                                                 
2 The author was recognized as an EMS Lieutenant by the EMS crews who immediately complied 
with the instructions to move.   
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b. Observe, Orient, Decide, Act LOOP Strengths and Weaknesses  
The concept of carrying out a loop or a cycle, such as found in OODA 
loop is an aspect found to be a beneficial process which the other models also contained.  
In addition, there is something to be gained from a model that only has four phases of 
observe, orient, decide, and act; such that it is simple to memorize and quick to put into 
action.  To explain, the short iterative loop concept of Boyd’s OODA loop simplifies the 
decision-making process to a point where there are no lengthy or difficult questions to 
decipher through.  Additionally, because the OODA loop is an uncomplicated model, 
“testing or checking the environment” (Drucker 1967, p. 94) for something happening is 
expedited.  Therefore, the second order category of sense-making has the potential to be 
achieved in a much more efficient manner.   
However, the simplified phases of OODA loop has some shortcomings.  
As pointed out by Lawson (1981), OODA loop does not take into account a terminal 
point or a “desired state” at which to exit the loop (p. 6).  By stepping through OODA 
loop as illustrated by using the 9/11 experience in the previous section, it is difficult to 
determine if the act phase is the point where the decision maker can end the process and 
make a decision.  Along the same principle of not having a point by which to consider a 
decisions status, there does not appear to be a step of checking for feedback to ensure the 
decision is on the correct track.  There is also an absence of a description of what it is that 
is to be achieved in each of the phases.  In addition, because one can only react to what 
one observes, if not observing the proper environment, the ensuing phase of orient, 
decide and act could end up being incorrect.   
4. Recognition-Primed Decision Model: RPD  
RPD (Figure 5) emphasizes that experience is used to make decisions and that 
there is no need to compare options when making a decision (Klein, 1998).  RPD theory 
provides that the decision maker basis their decision on something that is recognized 




other words, the decision makers finds something as close a possible that they have 
experienced in the past relative to the current situation to make the decision rather than 
turning to a step process (Klein, 1998).   
 
Figure 5.   Recognition-Primed Decision (RPD) Model (After Klein, Orasanu, 
Calderwood, & Zsambok, 1995, p. 108)   
Using the second order categories, the RPD is evaluated to demonstrate relevance 




Table 8.   RPD Evaluated Against the Second Order Categories  
Second Order Category Evaluation 
Assessment  
Separating a complex topic into 
smaller parts to gain a better 
understanding. 
RPD has a unique step that prompts the decision 
maker to “seek more information/reassess 
situation” if the situation is not familiar.  This 
section of the process encourages the decision 
maker to continually break down the situation until 
it is understood so that a decision can be made.   
Comparative Evaluation 
Continually measuring options 
against the current information. 
The initial section of “experience the situation in a 
changing context, seek more information/reassess 
situation” is where the decision maker continually 
evaluates the available information which can lead 
measuring what decision options are available.   
Constraints/Limitations/Stress 
Identifying limitations and 
constraints to actions.   
In the “are expectancies violated” section, the 
decision maker is asked to if expectancies, one of 
the four recognition aspects, are inhibiting the 
process.  This is a valuable section because it 
suggests to the decision maker that there may be a 
limitation in moving forward with the decision.  If 
there is, it warrants returning to the recognition 
section until the aspect is satisfied.  In other words, 
if the decision maker is not able to reach the terms 
of what would satisfy the decision, there is 
something such as a lack in information in the way. 
Pre-arranged  
Resorting to a set of predetermined 
rules or standards. 
The “Recognition has four aspects” section is 
useful in that it prompts the decision maker to seek 
out if there are any “Cues” or “Expectancies” that 
would assist in the process.    
Predictive Estimations 
Forecasting, estimating, and 
hypothesizing.  
The “Will it work” section has a helpful concept 
that gets the decision maker to consider if the 
decision being contemplated will work.  To satisfy 
this question, the decision maker is to either 
“Implement” or if the decision will not work, to 
“Modify.”   
Recognition  
Remembering from past events or 
past practices, assimilating to the 
situation, historical reflection. 
The theory of RPD is based on recognition and the 
beginning sections of the model require some form 
of recognition. 
Sense-making  
Define the situation and making 
sense of the situation by describing, 
classifying visual, textual, and oral, 
information. 
“Experience the situation in a changing context,” 
and “Seek more information/Reassess situation” is 
a significant section in the process which prompts 
the decision maker to continually make sense of the 
situation until it is familiar. 
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a. Evaluating RPD  
Using the decision to remain at street level while the event was unfolding 
or return back into the EOC to illustrate the second order categories and the concepts of 
the RPD model, the steps are put into action.   
Table 9.   RPD Put into Action 
Decision Step Second Order 
Categories 
Evaluation 
Experience the situation 
in a changing context  
Assessment   The situation at the WTC was 
dynamic and unfolded quickly.  
It became important to keep up 
with the situation.  This step 
helps to keep the decision maker 
engaged by experiencing the 
situation as it changes.   
Is the situation familiar? Sense-making Although in general the 
situation at the WTC was not 
familiar for making decisions, 
answering no to this question 
prompts the decision-maker to 
continually “seek more 
information” to make sense of 




Sense-making Again, the process of 
continually engaging in a sense-
making process is a valuable 
step towards making a decision.  
Using this step in the decision to 
remain at street level or return 
into the EOC, could have 
produced an efficient decision 
whereby the decision could 
have been arrived at more 
readily.   
Recognition has four 
aspects: Goals, Cues, 
Expectancies, Actions 
1…N  
Recognition  This step focuses on 
recognition.  Specifically, by 
using the four aspects the 
decision in this case would have 
considered if there were any 
past situations that could be 
recalled on to help make the 
decision.   
Will it work? Predictive Estimations  Using the steps of “Will it 
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Implement  work” and “Implement” would 
have prompted options to 
consider whether it was best to 
remain at street level or return 
to the EOC.  Based on weighing 
the options the decision would 
be made in a timely manner.  
Modify  Comparative Evaluation  Because the situation at the 
WTC was so dynamic and 
quickly changing, having an 
option in the process to modify 
the decision prior to being 
implemented is a very efficient 
step.  This step enables the 
decision to be mentally 
compared to other possible 
decisions prior to 
implementation.   
 
b. Recognition-Primed Decision Model Strengths and Weaknesses  
The first step in the RPD model describes what Klein observed his study 
subjects (firefighters and soldiers) doing as they entered the decision-making 
environment to make a decision (1995).  This initial step can be summarized as the 
decision maker experiencing and assessing the situation (environment), and if not 
satisfied, obtaining more information if needed.  This particular step focuses on the 
decision maker and the environment of the decision-maker that is a simple concept, yet a 
strong point found in RPD.  As a side note, this concept links back to the scissor analogy 
used by Simon (1990) where one side of the scissor is the cognitive abilities of the 
decision maker and the other side of the scissors is the structure the environment.  In 
summary, a strong point of RPD is that it takes into account the decision maker and the 
environment of the decision maker.  The added strengths of RPD is that it uses simple 
terminology such as “is the situation familiar, and will it work” (Klein et al., 1995, p. 
108) and the decision maker has options such as yes and no as a way to return to a step if 
a condition is not met.  By using yes and no options the model has an uninterrupted flow 
until the decision is reached and implemented; however, there are weaknesses to RPD.   
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Perhaps because RPD is based on observations of experienced decision 
makers while in their relevant settings, as a result they have the decision-making ability 
and the ability to recall on a past experiences to make the decisions, the model appears to 
satisfy decision making in general.  However, when applied to decision-making during a 
catastrophic disaster, the RPD model contains a weak element.  To illustrate, since it has 
been established in the Introduction section of this thesis, a catastrophic disaster is an 
incident that is significantly different than emergencies or routine disasters and contain 
problems never before experienced by the emergency manager.  How then can the 
decision maker recall on something when they have never had the experience?  RPD does 
not take into account a decision maker that has no recall or lacks the ability to make a 
decision.   
5. Catastrophic Disaster Decision-Making Model: CAT D² M² 
During the exploration of the most relevant decision-making models applicable to 
a situation where awareness is low and high levels of uncertainty and equivocality exist, 
it became apparent that the explored models and processes contained specific concepts 
that when leveraged generate the development of a new model to mitigate decision-
making paralysis. By eliminating the weakness and using the strengths of Drucker’s 
business model, MDMP, OODA loop, and RPD, a new process model was developed.   
This new model, CAT D² M², states in conceptual theory that decision-making 
paralysis can be mitigated by first making sense of the situation in gaining awareness 
through an iterative story building cycle of data referencing, visual sensing, and or 
listening for sufficient rather than suitable information followed by, if needed, a cycle of 
recalling on training and experience, use of heuristics, and story building until the 
decision maker reaches a desired state to make decisions.   
Achieving the desired state is a subjective variable dependent on the decision 
maker’s urgency in making the decision.  To describe, when lives are at stake, a decision 
to preserve lives could be contingent on limitations such as the decision maker’s abilities 
and information at the time.  However, reaching the desired state depends on the decision 
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maker’s minimum requirements for information or “satisficing” to make the decision 
(March, 1994; Simon, 1959).  The next section goes into details of the CAT D² M² 
process model.  
C. CAT D²M² STEPS AND DISCUSSION 
CAT D²M² (Figure 6) is a theoretical process model that takes into account the 
decision-making environment and the decision maker’s ability when situational 
awareness is low, high levels of uncertainty and equivocality exist, and there is an 
absence of recognition to make decisions.  This new process model considers a number 
of decision-making concepts from Drucker’s business model, MDMP and OODA loop, 
and RPD in combination with the emerged findings from the grounded theory research.  
Specifically, like Drucker’s steps and MDMP, CAT D²M² is a pre-arranged process 
containing the second order categories of assessment, comparative evaluation, 
constraints/limitations/stress, pre-arranged, predictive estimations, recognition, and 
sense-making.  Meaning it is a logical step-by-step approach that can be memorized to 
make decisions; or to mitigate decision-making paralysis.  There are three essential steps 
or questions contained in CAT D²M²:  
1. STEP A: Is There Sufficient Information, Situation Awareness, and 
Ability to Make the Decision?   
The objective of this step is to prompt the decision maker into considering if there 
is not enough ability, information, or situation awareness to make decisions; it must be 
obtained.  If the answer is no, next is to go to step B.  However, if the answer is yes to the 
question, the process does not prohibit making the decision.  The decision maker can 
proceed to Step D and make the decision.   
2. STEP B: Can the Environment Provide Information to Enhance 
Situation Awareness to Make the Decision? 
If the answer in Step B is yes, next is to proceed to Step C.  If the answer is no to 
Step B, the decision maker is prompted to seek out information from the environment by 
referencing data, hearing information, and or by visual sensing.  It is important to 
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recognize that Step B in general represents the decision-making environment where there 
is information that can be used for story building.  The reason for developing a step that 
seeks out data such as a printed material containing facts, listening to others for their 
opinions on the situation, and actually scanning the environment looking for signs or 
indications, is to increase the decision-makers situation awareness.  By gathering and 
comparing information discovered in this step, the expectation is that sense-making will 
be enhanced; thus leading to making a decision.   
To elaborate, the purpose of this step is to mitigate decision-making paralysis by 
enhancing the sense-making of the decision maker.  The process of going around-and-
around by checking the environment for information to enhance sense-making keeps the 
decision-maker engaged in the decision.  Otherwise, the decision-maker’s attention may 
become distracted or overwhelmed as I did at the WTC disaster on the decision to 
evacuate the EOC.  Conversely, the fire chiefs at the Baltimore Tunnel Fire remained 
engaged with their decisions by continually turning to the environment for information 
and cross referencing or comparing what they were finding during their evacuation 
decision.   
By keeping the decision maker occupied with in a comparative activity of 
referencing, hearing, and visualizing, the decision-maker remains connected to the 
environment until a point is reached where they feel they have enough information, or 
they are satisfied with the information (Simon, 1959) to make a decision.  In addition to a 
cycle of using the environment for information, this step also contains the second order 
category assessment.  Recall, assessment from the research is described as linking by 
comparison one piece of information to another.  For example, this step is to link and 
compare textual data to perhaps what was heard in order to keep the decision-making 
process from becoming parlayed.    
To recap, the intent of Step B is to engage the decision maker in an iterative cycle 
of gathering and comparing information until the decision maker reaches a desired 
information and situation awareness state.  Once this desired state is achieved, the next 
Step, C, asks about the ability of the decision maker.   
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3. STEP C: Does the Decision Maker Have the Ability to Make the 
Decision? 
If the decision maker has the ability to make the decision, meaning they have 
experience or can resort to a protocol or plan, then the next step is D: Decision; however, 
if there is no ability, the decision maker is prompted in Step C to engage in a cycle.   
To illustrate, this particular cycle is similar to the OODA loop.  It is designed to 
keep the decision maker engaged in the decision making process to increase decision-
making abilities.  The process includes recalling on training and experience, use what 
was gained in Step B through story building, and or use a rule of thumb (heuristics).  The 
notion is that the story building gained from the decision-making environment in Step B, 
in combination of recalling on some experience, even if it is from a past community 
emergency or disaster, can build the ability of the decision-maker to make the decision.   
This step also brings in the second order category assessment.  Similar in the 
previous step, the decision maker continually links and compares what was gained from 
recalling on training and experience, from story building, and from the use of rule of 
thumb to build upon the decision-making ability.  The goal in including a step such is this 
is to develop ability where it may be absent.  In other words, rather than becoming 
paralyzed in making a decision because of a lack in ability, by continually searching for 
something to stimulate the process such as recalling on a remotely similar situation or a 
protocol that can be somewhat related to the situation is better than nothing at all, which 
from first-hand experience is where decision-making paralysis occurs.   
There is an important component contained in Steps B and C that are missing in 
OODA loop and RPD.  This component is a way out of the iterative cycle.  For example, 
once a desired situation awareness and information state is achieved in Step B, there is a 
way to get out of the loop by going to Step C.  Similarly, Step C has an exit out of the 
cycle.  When the decision maker reaches the desired ability state, Step D, making the 
decision can be fulfilled.   
In summary, by examining Drucker’s steps, MDMP, OODA loop, RPD, and the 
CAT D²M² models, through my decision-making experience at the WTC, a pattern is 
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now evident.  A pattern which engages the decision maker in a cycle to establish that 
decision information and abilities are to be attained prior to “carrying out” (Drucker, 
1967), “producing orders” (MDMP, 2010), “acting” (Boyd, 1987) “implementing” 
(Klein, 1999) and “reaching a desired state” (CAT D²M²).  That through a process of 
sensemaking, recognition, and pre-arranged steps, decision-making paralysis can be 
mitigated.   
 







D. EVALUATING CAT D²M²  
Using the decision to evacuate lower Manhattan to illustrate the second order 
categories and the concepts of the MDMP model, the steps are put into action.  3   
Table 10.   CAT D²M² Evaluated Against the Second Order Categories 
Decision Step Second Order Categories Evaluation 




ability to make the 




Step A is a fundamental step 
that either leads to ending or 
beginning the process model.  
Using this step on the 
evacuation decision, at the time 
the issue was raised to evacuate 
lower Manhattan there was 
little information on the status 
of the roadways and bridges out 
of Manhattan.  In addition, 
situation awareness was low 
because the event was dynamic 
and unfolding at a level never 
before experienced, and the 
ability to make the decision 
was low because decisions like 
this were beyond the scope of 
what the author had made 
decisions on before.  Not being 
able to answer these questions, 
the next step is to turn to the 
decision-making environment 
for data referencing, listening 
for information, and visualizing 
the environment.   











Initially, the environment was 
not able to provide the needed 
information.  In this case, the 
CAT D²M² iterative cycle 
would begin and continue to 
build a story until a desired 
state of information and 
situation awareness was 
                                                 
3 Prior to making the decision to evacuate lower Manhattan, the North Tower collapsed followed by 
the South Tower a short time later.  As a result, all emergency management operations temporarily ceased 
for obvious reasons.   
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Decision Step Second Order Categories Evaluation 
achieved.  For example, there 
was limited information being 
reported over the two-way 
portable radios on the traffic 
conditions hampering the 
incoming fire and police units.  
Carefully listening to these 
reports provided some 
information such as the 
Brooklyn and Manhattan 
bridges were being used by 
people to self-evacuate on 
foot, the Battery Tunnel was at 
a gridlock, and the FDR Drive 
was congested with north-
bound traffic.  This iterative 
cycle continues until enough 
information is gathered to raise 
situation awareness to either 
make the decision, or at this 
point the ability of the 
decision-maker is questioned.   
C. Does the decision 
maker have the 
ability to make the 
decision? 
 
Recognition, Pre-arranged  Having never been confronted 
with a decision to evacuate 
such a large area in such short 
notice under stressful 
conditions, the author’s ability 
to make a decision of this 
magnitude was low.  In this 
situation, using CAT D²M² the 
decision maker would have 
been prompted to enter into an 
iterative cycle of ability 
building. This involves 
recalling on training and 
experience, using the story 
building from the previous step, 
and using a rule of thumb.  For 
example, the author would have 
recalled on experience from 
past flooding events where 
small portions of a community 
had to be evacuated, used a rule 
of thumb when considering an 
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Decision Step Second Order Categories Evaluation 
evacuation of: how many will 
go, where will they go, how 
will they get there?  The other 
option would be to reference 
the story built in the previous 
step.  Once a desired state of 
ability is achieved in this step, 
the decision-maker can proceed 
to the final step of making the 
decision and ending the CAT 
D²M² process.   
D. Decision  Predictive Estimations In this step the decision maker 
simply makes the decision 
which ends the process.  
However, prior to making the 
decision, the decision maker is 
prompted to build their ability 
and build a story from the 
environment.  During the 
ability and story building 
process, there is a constant 
cycle contained in-between 
Steps B and C of reaching a 
“desired state”.  This process 
requires some speculation or 
forecasting of the decision.   
Because of the Towers 
collapsing, the decision to 
evacuate lower Manhattan was 
never brought to fruition.   
 
E. CATASTROPHIC DISASTER DECISION-MAKING MODEL 
STRENGTH AND WEAKNESSES  
Because CAT D²M² takes into account the decision-making environment and the 
decision maker’s ability when situational awareness is low, high levels of uncertainty and 
equivocality exist; it is prescriptively adequate for a catastrophic disaster.  The process 
model was developed by discarding the weakness of the models reviewed and leveraging 
their strengths.  Because CAT D²M² has taken notice of the strong point of other models, 
it contains easy to understand terms, it has a flow that is flexible and simple to follow, it 
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takes into consideration an exit point, and most importantly it incorporates the decision-
maker and the decision making environment into the process.  To elaborate, CAT D²M² 
was developed by conducting research on catastrophic disaster cases, using theories from 
the study area of decision making, and leveraging existing decision-making models.  By 
following this course of action only the most relevant decision-making findings were 
applied to the development of CAT D²M².   
CAT D²M² is a prescriptive process that contains several unique steps.  For 
example, there is a start point where the decision maker can enter the process and an end 
point to exit.  A distinct step leveraged from the researched models is of the cycles that 
are contained in the story-building and ability building areas of the model.  Here the 
decision maker is engaged in a cycle to increase situational awareness and sense-making 
as well as enhance the ability of the decision maker.  It is not just a cycle of linking one 
step to the other, the cycle points the decision maker to the decision-making environment 
for data referencing, hearing information and visual sensing.  In addition, the decision 
maker is directed to recall on training and experience, use story building from the 
previous step, and use rules of thumb to build upon the decision-making ability.   
There are no constraining points contained in the model. A distinctive step in the 
cycle process of CAT D²M² is that there are exit points when the decision maker reaches 
a desired state.  This allows the decision maker to proceed to the final decision-making as 
quickly as desired; even if that means having to skip a step because it is not needed.   
Finally, CAT D²M² is developed by taking a neutral position on the decision-
making environment and the ability of the decision maker.  Meaning, it could be an 
environment rich with information and the ability of the decision maker may be excellent, 
or it could be the opposite.  Either way, the model can be still used.   
However, there are weaknesses.  Not weakness to the model itself, weakness in 
that CAT D²M² was developed based on research, not on actual observations.  Therefore 
it is unsure where the weaknesses are in the process.  The true weakness will not become 
realized until the model is used and evaluated in an actual catastrophic disaster.   
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VII. ANSWERING THE RESEARCH QUESTION AND 
EVALUATION OF CAT D²M²  
This thesis began by asking if a new decision-making model could be developed 
for use during catastrophic disasters.  Specifically, the question asked how can a new 
model be designed leveraging existing decision-making models to mitigate decision-
making paralysis during catastrophic disasters when experience and situational awareness 
of the decision maker is low and the disaster environment has high levels of uncertainty 
and equivocality?  Although there was no single decision-making model found to be 
capable of mitigating decision-making paralysis, the existing models researched did 
contain concepts that when leveraged lead to the development of CAT D²M².  Therefore, 
the answer to the research question is yes.   
To evaluate CAT D²M², or formally ground the concept of a descriptive decision 
process model, Glauser and Strauss suggest that the research is to be “accurate in fit and 
relevance to the area it purports to explain” (1967, p. 224).  Meaning that the findings and 
theories that have lead to developing a new decision-making process model are truthful to 
the catastrophic disaster cases researched, the literature reviewed, and is germane in 
answering the research question.  To ensure that CAT D²M² is accurate in fit and 
relevance calls for evaluating the process by asking first if it: 
…closely fits the substantive area in which it will be used, second is 
readily understandable by laymen concerned with this area, third it is 
sufficiently general to be applicable to a multitude of diverse daily 
situations within the substantive area, and fourth it must allow the user 
partial control over the structure and process of daily situations as they 
change through time. (Glauser & Strauss, 1967, p. 237)   
The following outlines how CAT D²M²is evaluated against Glauser and Strauss’ 
criteria (1967): 
 Closely fits the substantive area in which it will be used - Because the 
concept of CAT D²M² is based on grounded theory research on 
catastrophic disaster cases, and scholarly decision-making theories and 
process, it fits well into the area of decision-making; specifically decision-
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making during a catastrophic disaster.  CAT D²M² is a practical mitigation 
solution to assist when decision-making becomes paralyzed.   
 Readily understandable by laymen concerned with this area - CAT D²M² 
is easy for the emergency manager as a decision maker to understand and 
use.  There is no technical jargon to learn, it follows a logical progression 
for making a decision, and because it is easily understandable and flexible, 
can become quickly committed to memory.  
 Sufficiently general to be applicable to a multitude of diverse daily 
situations within the substantive area - CAT D²M² is adaptable to any type 
of catastrophic disaster such as a hurricane or a terrorist event.  It can also 
be used during an emergency or routine disaster.  In addition, the process 
can be applied to any decision-making situation when situational 
awareness is low, high levels of uncertainty and equivocality exist, and 
there is an absence of recognition to make decisions.   
 Allows the user partial control over the structure and process of daily 
situations as they change through time - The decision maker using CAT 
D²M² is in control of the process flow and information used to make the 
decisions.  There are no binding conditions to satisfy causing the process 
to stall, and there are no limitations to how often the iterative cycles can 
be used to make a decision.  It is entirely up to the user to decide which 
step to proceed to, to make the determination when a desired state is 
reached, and when to exit the cycles.   
A final measure is that CAT D²M² provides a foundation for future catastrophic 
disaster decision-making research.  One way to determine this is to have the new model 
reviewed and commented on by emergency managers and decision-making scholars.  It is 
anticipated that the idea of using the environment to build situation awareness and 
decision-making abilities, and that the elements that constitute the iterative cycle are 
evaluated for their effectiveness in mitigating decision-making paralysis.  An added value 
is if CAT D²M² is applied to an actual incident.  If CAT D²M² is evaluated and 
commented on by emergency managers and decision-making scholars, it has proven 
capable of rising to a level of attention and, thereby, deemed as a contribution to the 




CAT D²M² is a prescriptive process model based on conducting grounded theory 
research and an extensive literature review.  The concept leading up to the development 
of the descriptive decision process model resulted in using an inductive method rather 
than a deductive method; however, it could benefit greatly from being tested and 
evaluated in an actual setting such as a disaster.  Because CAT D²M² was developed by 
using an inductive method leveraging existing decision-making models it is a practical 
solution in mitigating decision-making paralysis.   
CAT D²M² appears to succeed from one researcher’s perspective used in this 
thesis, which is to make a judgment call based on past experiences and hope it satisfies 
the need (Klein, 1998).  Therefore, the delivery of CAT D²M² to interested parties, such 
as emergency managers and decision-making researchers, needs to illustrate that 
judgment calls are inefficient and the idea of engaging in an iterative cycle could be a 
solution to mitigating decision-making paralysis.   
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APPENDIX. SECOND ORDER CATEGORIES 
Table 11.   Baltimore Tunnel Fire of 2001  
 
Informant’s Codes Analytical Codes Second Order Categories 
A situation that had no 
parallels in their collective 
experience 
Recall 
They were not able to 
remember a past event or past 
practice that they could use to 
assimilate to the situation.  
This was a contributing factor in 
the decision to evacuate.   
Recognition 
They realized the smoke was 
not dissipating at all 
Diagnose 
Concerned with a BLEVE, and 
the decision to allow firefighters 
to work in the tunnel, they were 
able to define and make sense 
of the situation by 
visualization.   
Sense-making 
The smoke, it now dawned on 
them, was a result of a fire, not 
diesel fumes… 
Comparing/Recall  
A contributing component to the 
overall decision-making that 
would be forthcoming.  Here a 
comparison of a current 
visualization against what the 
FF had experienced in the past 
allowed them to begin 







When they reviewed the way-
bill 
Targeting  
Because they were in 
information deprivation, the FF 
sought out specific 
information for analysis to help 
them make decisions.   
Pre-arranged 
They realized with this 
information 
Diagnose 
With the way-bill in hand, they 
were able to begin defining the 
situation and make sense of 
the situation via textual 
information.  
Sense-making 
Assessment   
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Informant’s Codes Analytical Codes Second Order Categories 
Receiving reports from the 
public  
Diagnose 
There was specific information 
about the situation coming in 
from the public that needed to 
be deciphered.  The situation 
was made sense of via 
descriptions of oral information 
which contributed to how 
decisions would be made.   
Sense-making 
Observed a huge plume of 
smoke  
Diagnose 
Seeing a plume of smoke, and 
recognizing this was not good, 
provided visual information to 




Used to responding to 
structure fires 
Recall 
A statement on what is 
routinely conducted and how 
that experience was not helpful 
in this situation.  The FF could 
not assimilate to the current 
situation.   
Recognition 
So its like a routine call 
Recall 
Remembering from past 
events or past practices, 
assimilating to the situation, 
historical reflection 
Recognition 
Reports from the public were 
supplemented  
Diagnose 
Define the situation and making 
sense of the situation by 
receiving oral information 
 
Sense-making 
Getting a lot of information 
very quickly at that point  
Diagnose 
A contributing DM point in 
getting information from CSX 
and the public. Making sense of 
the situation via oral 








No one was quite sure what 
these chemicals would do 
Comparing  
There was no recall from a past 
situation, which lead to no comparison 
or an analysis to predict what to do. 
No assessment of the current 
information, measuring options 
against the current information, 
forecasting, predicting, estimating, 







I think we all knew that there 
was a potential for something 
really serious with the hazmat 
component  
Recall  
Based on past experience and 
training, the FF were able to use that 
to make a decision that there was a 
high risk of sending FF into the 
tunnel.   
Recognition 
It has wiped out small towns 
Recall 
They knew from training that a 
BLEVE was a dangerous situation and 
decisions should were based on 
knowing that  
Recognition 
Were not familiar with the 
chemicals on the derailed train  
Recall 
Remembering from past events or past 
practices, assimilating to the situation, 
historical reflection 
Recognition 
Could not predict how the 
chemicals would react with 
each other  
Recall/Comparing  
The FF had no way of knowing and 
comparing to a similar situation to 
make future decisions on evacuating 






I couldn’t tell what that was 
going to do to the tunnel  
Bounding  
With limited information, knowledge 
and experience, FF did not know 
what would occur.  Identification of 
limitations and constraints to actions.  
Constraints 
Limitations   
Wondered what was in the 
black smoke boiling out of 
both ends of the tunnel  
Comparing  
As assessment of the current 
information, measuring options 
against the current information, 
forecasting, predicting, estimating, 







Type of incident that you 
could not see 
Bounding  
Assessing the situation was bounded 
because it was in a tunnel. 
Identification of limitations and 
constraints to actions  
Constraints 
Limitations   
Not being able to tell what 
exactly was burning or even 
see what the fire looked like 
left officials in the dark and 
guessing  
Bounding  
Assessing the situation was bounded 
because it was in a tunnel. 
Identification of limitations and 
constraints to actions 
Constraints 
Limitations   
There were mainly unknowns  
Bounding  
In trying to gain situational awareness 
of the scene, there were limitations 
and constraints to actions  
Constraints 
Limitations   
React only to visible evidence 
(volume of smoke, color of 
smoke, intensity of smoke)  
Bounding  
Decisions on what to do where based 
on limited visuals  
Constraints 
Limitations   
Unfamiliarity of the situation  
Comparing  
As assessment of the current 
information, measuring options 
against the current information, 
forecasting, predicting, estimating, 






With chemicals, you don’t 
know what your dealing with  
Bounding  
Decisions where confined because the 
chemicals limited actions.  
Constraints 
Limitations   
Could see clouds of black 
smoke ominously  
Diagnose 
Define the situation and making sense 
of the situation by visual.  
Sense-making 
This had the most potential to 
be the most devastating event 
in his experience  
Comparing  
The FF was recalling on past 
experience to compare how 







City’s emergency response 
plan did not spell out 
procedures for determining  
Bounding  
There was no guidance for decisions 
on what to do for an evacuation   
Constraints 
Limitations   
A department manual spelled 
out the succession of the 
incident commanders  
Targeting  
Conforming to a set of predetermined 
rules or standards  
Pre-arranged 
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They basically knew what I 
needed before I had to tell 
them Because everything we 
were supposed to know about 
dealing with a situation was 
being carried out, just like a 
normal fire  
Recall 
At times decisions were not needed, 
the crews knew what to do based on 
past experience, training.  Recognition 
This was no ordinary fire  
Comparing  
The FF was comparing this situation 
to past experience in order to decide 







Its just like walking into an 
oven  
Diagnose 
By assimilating/comparing the 
situation to something, information 
was now registered for decision-
making 
Sense-making 
Evaluate the situation and 
formulate a plan of attack 
Comparing  
As assessment of the current 
information, measuring options 
against the current information, 
forecasting, predicting, estimating, 







Build a confident decision-
making process  
Comparing  







Have somebody go in there 
and physically get close to the 
actual incident and assess it, 
relay the information, continue 
to build the decision-making 
model  
Diagnose 






In the absence of first hand 
observation, officials fell back 
on the data available to them 
from other sources (way bill) 
Bounding  
Identification of limitations and 
constraints to actions  
Constraints 
Limitations   
Information could be quickly 
gleaned from the data  
Diagnose 
Define the situation and making sense 
of the situation by describing, 




SME’s were able to offer some 
reassurance  
Bounding  
Where the information to make 
decisions was not readily available or 
known because it was technical 
situation, the FF fell back on SME’s.  
Constraints 
Limitations   
After conferring with 
emergency personnel, decided 
not to evacuate  
Comparing  
A discussion on the decision to 
evacuate relied on the people with 






Feared a mass exodus could 
lead to panic  
Comparing  
As assessment of the current 
information, measuring options 
against the current information, 
forecasting, predicting, estimating, 






A decision made in 
conjunction with the Mayor’s 
office  
Bounding  
The decision to evacuate required 
group involvement.   
Constraints 
Limitations   
There was some difference of 
opinion about which approach 
to take 
Bounding  
Identification of limitations and 
constraints to actions  
Constraints 
Limitations   
Worst case scenario, what do 
you need?  
Comparing  
To make a decision to dedicate 
additional resources to the incident, it 
was asked of the FF to predict what 






I thought that what was shut 
down was necessary for safety 
operations   
Comparing  
The decision to shut down traffic was 
based on a prediction that that was 






The smoke from the fire 
indicated the presence of only 
carbonaceous material  
Diagnose 
The visual contributed to future 
decisions based on what the FF 
recognized or knew from training.   
Recognition  
Sense-making 
From his own inclination that 
it was better to overreact than 
under-react 
Recall 
Remembering from past events or past 
practices, assimilating to the situation, 
historical reflection 
Recognition 
Unaware of the water main 
break, they noticed changes to 
the smoke from black to white 
Diagnose 
Define the situation and making sense 
of the situation by describing, 




Initially unsure how to 
interpret 
Comparing  
As assessment of the current 
information, measuring options 
against the current information, 
forecasting, predicting, estimating, 






The domino effect of events  
Comparing  
As assessment of the current 
information, measuring options 
against the current information, 
forecasting, predicting, estimating, 






Most had never experienced a 
crisis of this complexity and 
duration  
Recall 
Remembering from past events or past 
practices, assimilating to the situation, 
historical reflection 
Recognition 
With usual incidents, things 
begin to go into the decision 
model within a short period of 
time.  This was not the case.  
Comparing  
As assessment of the current 
information, measuring options 
against the current information, 
forecasting, predicting, estimating, 






In all my years I never had an 
incident of that magnitude the 
required that much 
coordination  
Recall 
Remembering from past events or past 
practices, assimilating to the situation, 
historical reflection 
Recognition 
The scene was confusing  
Diagnose 
Define the situation and making sense 
of the situation by describing, 
classifying visual, textual, and oral, 
information 
Sense-making 
Tried to figure out where to go 
Comparing  
The arriving FF crews had to make a 
decision on where to report into based 







The situation got more and 
more convoluted as additional 
agencies became involved.  
Bounding  
Limitations and constraints to actions 
lead to confusion which clouded 
decision-making 
Constraints 
Limitations   
When we were doing 
something, everybody had to 
have buy in 
Bounding  
Concurrence on decisions required 
time.  Identification of limitations and 
constraints to actions  
Constraints 
Limitations   
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The needed contributors were 
not on hand  
Bounding  
Identification of limitations and 
constraints to actions  
Constraints 
Limitations   
Officials were doing there own 
independent things  
Bounding  
Decisions were being made without 
consulting others. Identification of 
limitations and constraints to actions  
Constraints 
Limitations   
There were no formal 
procedures  
Bounding  
No decision aides.  Identification of 
limitations and constraints to actions  
Constraints 
Limitations   
The process to get permission 
to do something proved 
cumbersome  
Bounding  
Identification of limitations and 
constraints to actions  
Constraints 
Limitations   
You don’t make any decisions 
without approval  
Bounding  
Identification of limitations and 
constraints to actions  
Constraints 
Limitations   
I tried not to apply time 
pressures  
Bounding  
Identification of limitations and 
constraints to actions  
Constraints 
Limitations   
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Table 12.   9/11 Pentagon Emergency  
Informant’s Codes Analytic Codes  Second Order Categories 
The details of the incident 
emerged over days  
Diagnose  
The accumulative information 
on the situation progressively 
contributed to making better 
sense of the situation  
Sense-making 
Suddenly noticed a plane 
He saw a great flash in the 
side of the building 
Diagnose  
This was a stunning visual that 
would lead to future decision-
making  
Sense-making 
Start with the most urgent 
tasks  
Sort  
Once the incident began to 
unfold, there were decisions that 





Develop a larger 
organizational structure as 
more crews arrived 
Forecast  
There was a decision needed to 




Immediate life and death 
struggle gave way to the 
longer term campaign  
Predictive estimations 
The decision not to save lives yet 
look beyond into the future of 





The sheer size of the 
Pentagon made it hard to 
get a comprehensive 
picture of the damage. 
Limited situation awareness  
The size of the situation made it 
difficult in order to make 
effective decision,  
Sense-making 
Constraints/Limitations 
It was possible to see how 
deeply the plane had 
penetrated the Pentagon  
Visual awareness  Sense-making 
Used a helicopter to have a 
global look-down view of 
the scene He could also see 
that the fire was huge 
Obtain situation awareness  
 
Sense-making 
Coupled with the 
knowledge that the 
Pentagon was constructed 
of concrete 
Recall  
The FF was able to recall on past 
knowledge  
Recognition 
Received intelligence that 
another hijacked plane was 
heading there way  
Verbal situation awareness  Sense-making 
How many more attacks 
would there be? 
Forecasting  




unfolding  Assessment 
Predictive estimations 
What were the likely 
targets? 
Forecasting  






In the absence of clear 
information  
Forecasting  
Decisions were still needed to 
move the incident forward, 






There were stories of an 
explosion etc.  
Verbal situation awareness 
 
Sense-making 
Given the fact that the 
terrorists had struck the 
WTC twice, they though 
they could be planning a 
second strike on the 
Pentagon as well 
Situation awareness  
The fire chief need to take into 
account what was going on 
outside of the Pentagon as part 





He knew evacuating rescue 
people would be a 
controversial decision  
Comparing  
The fire chief needed to do some 
quick analysis on how the 






He decided the chances 
were too high to take the 
risk and he evacuated the 
site  
Comparing  
After analysis the decision was 





Had NY not happened, the 
notion of another plan 
hitting the Pentagon 
wouldn’t have been within 
my scope of reference.  
Comparing  
Comparing what had happened 






But I did see the second 
airplane fly into the WTC 
so it was a scope of my 
reference  
Situation awareness  
Awareness via a visual that 






Because of the chaos, no 
one was making decisions 
about how to maximize 
safety  
Bounding  
The situation was driving/limiting 
decision-making  
Constraints 
Limitations   
Nothing in their past 
emergency response work 
had prepared them for this 
Recall  
The fire crews had not been 
through anything like this which 
Recognition 
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situation.  limits decision-making abilities.  
The pace of events was too 
frenetic to allow for a 
deliberative group process 
Bounding  
Decisions were needed quickly 
by the group of FF, yet the 
situation could not support  
Constraints 
Limitations   
FEMA representatives had 
a lot of experience with 
large-scale incidents.  
Recall  
The fire chief deliberated on 






I never thought about how 
to meet nutritional needs of 
responders 
Forecasting  
The fire chief did not know the 
decision to feed the fire crews 
snacks as opposed to meals could 





I was accustomed to 
incidents that lasted a few 
hours 
Recall  
The fire chief needed to make 
decisions that spanned and 
effected more operational 
periods 
Recognition 
Traditionally he says the 
commanders left it to the 
ARC 
Recall  
The fire chief understood that an 
SOP was in place on the decision 
to feed the FF 
Recognition 
I was just looking for 
practical solutions.  I 
thought this was the best 
way to deal with this 
Forecasting  
The fire chief was making 









Table 13.   9/11 World Trade Center Terrorists Attacks – Fire Department of New 
York City Operations 
Informant’s Codes Analytic code Second Order Categories 
Witnessed the impact of the 
plane  
Situation awareness  
Contributed to the importance of 
the decisions that needed to be 
made 
Sense-making 
Immediately signaled a second 
alarm….. 
Requested additional resources 
by transmitting a third alarm 
Recall  
Decision on whether there was a 
need for additional assistance and 
then using a predetermined SOP to 
fulfill the request 
Recognition 
Pre-arranged 
As the first responding chief, he 
established the Incident 
Command Post in the lobby, 
per FDNY’s high-rise 
firefighting procedures. 
Targeting  
Decision on how to begin 
managing the incident  Pre-arranged 
Incident Command was 
established and passed 
(according to protocol) from B1 
to the First Division Chief (D1) 
to the Citywide Tour 
Commander 4D (CWTC-4D) 
Targeting  
Decision on who is in charge  
Pre-arranged 
Incident Commander moved the 
Incident Command Post from 
the lobby of WTC 1 to the far 
side of West Street (an eight lane 
highway) opposite WTC 1, 
because of the increasing risk 
from falling debris within and 
around the lobby and other 
safety concerns. 
Forecasting  
Decision on moving the ICP 





Chief officers considered a 
limited, localized collapse of the 
towers possible, but did not 
think that they would collapse 
entirely. 
Forecasting   








The Field Communications Unit 
(Field Com) set up operations 
at the West Street ICP at 
approximately 9:15 a.m., in 
accordance with protocols.  
Targeting  
Deciding where to set up Field 
Comm – no direction given Pre-arranged 
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Early in the response, they 
decided that operations in WTC 
1 should focus on search and 
rescue of injured and trapped 
civilians.  In response to specific 
distress calls (e.g., people 
stranded in elevators, trapped in 
rooms, or hurt who would either 
call 911 or contact OP-1 directly 
through WTC 1’s internal 
telephone system). To ensure 
that floors below the fire had 
been totally evacuated. 
Comparing/Forecasting  






D1 and B1 directed Port 
Authority personnel to 
evacuate surrounding buildings 
as a precautionary measure. 
Comparing/Forecasting  






several responding units were 
unable to reach their staging 
areas with their apparatus and 
therefore proceeded on foot 
directly to the tower lobbies  
Bounding  
Decision to abort COA and adjust  Constraints 
Limitations   
Units that failed to stage may 
have not received necessary 
information and orientation 
before going into the towers. As 
a result, several companies that 
were not from surrounding 
battalions had problems 
differentiating WTC 1 from 
WTC 2. Interviews with chief 
officers in command of the WTC 
1 Operations Post indicated that 
several units that arrived there 
asked for confirmation of 
whether they were in the lobby 
of WTC 1 or WTC 2.  
Situation awareness  








Because information about 
civilians in distress continued to 
reach the Operations Post in the 
lobby, the chief officers decided 
to continue their attempts to 
evacuate and rescue civilians, 
despite the communications 
Situation awareness  
Decision on which actions to take  
Sense-making 
Constraints 
Limitations   
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difficulties. 
Chief officers in the lobbies of 
both towers also had very little 
reliable information about 
what was happening outside 
the towers, beyond their 
communications with the ICP. 
They had no reliable sources of 
intelligence and had no 
external information about the 
overall status of the incident 
area, the condition of the towers 
or the progression of the fires. 
For example, they had no access 
to television reports or reports 
from an NYPD helicopter that 
was hovering above the towers. 
This lack of information 
hindered their ability to evaluate 
the overall situation.  
Bounding  
Lack of information to make 
decisions  
Constraints 
Limitations   
At approximately 9:30 a.m., 
personnel in the lobby of WTC 1 
heard an unconfirmed report 
of a threat from a third plane. 
Due to this announcement and 
communications problems that 
were constraining command and 
control capabilities, CWTC-4D 
broadcast over the FDNY 
tactical radio channel assigned to 
WTC 1 an order to all FDNY 
members to come down to the 
lobby of WTC 1. There was no 
acknowledgement by officers or 
firefighters of the order. 
Situation awareness  








Shortly after the order was 
given, chief officers in the lobby 
learned that the threat of a 
third plane was false. At this 
point, the chiefs continued the 
search and rescue operations. 
Situation awareness  
Decision to continue ops based on 
information  Sense-making 
 
The experience and leadership 
of these senior chiefs proved 
crucial to re-establishing 
command and control after the 
Recall  
Decisions based on experience  Recognition 
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towers collapsed.  
Many believed that a partial 
collapse within the lobby of 
WTC 1 had occurred or that the 
elevators or other debris had 
fallen into the lobby of WTC 1. 
The lobby of WTC 1 filled with 
blinding dust and debris and 
became untenable. In almost 
complete darkness, firefighters, 
officers, chiefs and civilians 
were forced to leave the lobby 
of WTC 1. Prior to searching for 
an exit for himself, B1 issued an 
order at approximately 10:00 
a.m. over the portable (handier 
talkie) radio for all FDNY 
members to evacuate WTC 1 
Bounding  
Decision to evacuate MOS based 
on tangible conditions.  In this case 
an “order” is considered the 







The Department had no process 
for evaluating the need for 
mutual aid, nor any formal 
methods of requesting that aid 
or managing it. Therefore, the 
Department had limited ability to 
evaluate how mutual aid could 
be integrated into its operations.  
Bounding  
Decision to request assistance – no 
formal process  
Constraints 
Limitations   
These initial mutual aid requests 
did not specify the level and 
type of resources needed. In 
addition, the FDNY did not 
have adequate information on 
the resources and capabilities of 
departments in surrounding 
cities and counties (e.g., the size, 
capabilities and expertise of 
different units). And, the FDNY 
had minimal operational 
training with surrounding fire 
departments, and hence had 
limited ability to evaluate 
whether and how resources from 
other departments could be 
integrated with the FDNY’s 
operations. For instance, it could 
not tell whether procedures 
Bounding  
Factors contributing to the inability 
to make decisions  
Constraints 
Limitations   
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could be integrated, equipment 
could interoperate, and whether 
the capabilities of units with the 
same names (e.g., rescue or 
hazmat) were comparable. 
Some potentially important 
information on the structural 
integrity of the buildings never 
reached the Incident Commander 
or the senior FDNY chiefs in the 
lobbies. 
Bounding  
Information need to make decisions  
Constraints 
Limitations   
However, the Incident 
Commander and the chief 
officers responsible for the 
operations posts were required 
to make decisions on these 
matters lacking some important 
information, including: reliable 
intelligence, media reports, 
aerial video coverage, or verbal 
reports from helicopters on the 
condition of the towers and 
traffic.  
Bounding  
Information need to make decisions 
Constraints 
Limitations   
After the buildings collapsed, 
planning and logistics 
requirements grew well beyond 
anything FDNY had experienced 
before. 
For instance, the logistics 
required supporting the search, 
rescue, and recovery operations 
after the collapses were massive 
and unprecedented for the 
FDNY.  
Bounding  
Limited experience  
Constraints 
Limitations   
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Table 14.   9/11 World Trade Center Terrorists Attacks – New York City Emergency 
Medical Services Operations  
Informant’s Codes Analytic code Second Order Categories 
Upon confirmation that an 
airplane had flown into WTC 
1, the Manhattan Central 
dispatcher immediately 
assigned ambulance units to 
the scene and transferred the 
incident to the EMS citywide 
dispatcher, in accordance 
with EMS protocols. 
Situation awareness/Targeting  
Decision based upon what was 
transmitted via two-way radio to 




He assigned Conditions Car 
042 to establish a division on 
Church Street and decided to 
move the EMS Command Post 
to the lobby of WTC 1, next to 
the Incident Command Post 
(ICP) that had been established 
by Fire Operations. (FDNY 
protocols require that EMS 
Command report to the 
Incident Commander. See 
Exhibit 12 for an EMS 
command and control events 
timeline.) 
Targeting  
Decision to establish command post 
locations based on protocol  
Pre-arranged 
However, as EMS Command 
moved into the lobby of WTC 
1, he was not immediately 
aware that the FDNY Incident 
Commander (the Chief of 
Department) was moving the 
ICP to the far side of West 
Street, in front of 2 World 
Financial Center. 
Bounding  
Decision outcome failed due to lack 
of information  
Constraints 
Limitations   
EMS chiefs responding to the 
incident had difficulty 
communicating over the radio 
due to the large volume of 
radio traffic. This impeded 
their ability to gain 
awareness of the overall 
situation at the scene. 
Bounding  
Situation awareness constrained 
leading to decision-making 
paralysis.  
Constraints 
Limitations   
 100
On September 11, EMS 
dispatchers were dealing with 
a high volume of 
information, a very large 
number of responding units, 
a complex incident response, 
and a myriad of 
communications difficulties. 
As a result, they were 
overwhelmed, limiting their 
ability to synthesize 
information and disseminate it 
effectively. 
Bounding  
Situation awareness and decision-
making constrained by the 
environment  
Constraints 
Limitations   
Incident Commander and 
senior chiefs had a limited 
amount of information 
available to them as they 
made important decisions.  
Bounding  
Situation awareness constrained 
Constraints 
Limitations   
Car 6A and Car 6C (the Tour 1 
EMS Chief Officer) would 
proceed to One Police Plaza, 
on the assumption that 
responding agencies would be 
coordinated from that location, 
given the destruction of the 
city’s Office of Emergency 
Management (OEM) offices at 
WTC 7.  
Recall/Forecasting  
Decision based on 
assumption/experience/intuition? 








Unknown to those chiefs and 
officers, other EMS chiefs had 
already established additional 
EMS divisions elsewhere.  
Bounding  
Information limitations and 
decisions made unknowingly  
Constraints 
Limitations   
Car 4P, also unaware of the 
establishment of divisions at 
Chelsea Piers and Staten Island 
Ferry Terminal, immediately 
established a division at West 
and Chambers Street. 
Bounding  
Decisions made based on unknown 
information  
Constraints 
Limitations   
In all likelihood there was 
confusion or 
misinterpretation whether 
EMS personnel were also 
being recalled when the Chief 
of Department recalled all Fire 
personnel.  
Bounding  
Decisions based on poor information  
Constraints 
Limitations   
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Table 15.   The 1999 Hurricane Floyd Evacuation in Florida  
 
Informant’s Codes Analytic code Second Order Categories 
A hurricane as large as any 
in the State’s history 
approached 
Recall 
Past hurricanes were used to compare 
to what was about to occur as part of 





DEM believed they had 
devised a plan for a large-
scale evacuation 
Forecasting  
Based on the plan written for this 
scenario, they believed it would 
address the forthcoming problems 
Predictive 
estimations 
Officials envisioned a 
massive but staged 
evacuation  
Forecasting  
Because the evacuation was yet to 
start, there was no actual information, 
and the decision to evacuate was 




Along with the early 
warnings, this would, it was 
thought, allow time to for an 
evacuation 
Forecasting 
Decision-making was being based on 




Clearance times proved to 
be higher than anticipated 
Diagnose/Comparing 
As the evacuation ensued, the actual 
data was compared to the predicted 






Because of the regular 
threat of hurricanes and 
their impact on a state 
surrounded on three sides by 
water 
Recall  
History has shown what they had been 
through which influenced evacuation 
and other decisions  
Recognition 
 
No evacuation could be 
ordered without an 
executive order 
Bounding  
Although the decision was made, there 
were influences via policy  
Constraints 
Limitations   
The state OEM alerted local 
OEMS an state of 
emergency was imminent  
Forecasting  
Based on weather forecasts, the 
decision was made to alert others 
Predictive 
estimations 
A wide range of hurricane 
scenarios were studied  
Targeting  
Specific types of data were sought and 
used in comparison to the current 





Based on historical 
information, they could 
estimate how many people 
Recall/Compare/Forecasting 
Past data compared to the current 





would evacuate  evacuations  Predictive 
estimations 
The combination of 
estimating the impact of the 
storm and estimating 
evacuation compliance levels 
led state officials to estimate 
clearance times  
Forecasting/Compare  
Evacuations were based on clearance 
times, weather data, evacuee behavior 






Hurricanes historically hit 
Florida with high winds and 
storm surge  
Recall 




Such surges can inundate 
low lying areas which in 
recent years have been built 
up with resorts and new 
homes 
Recall 
On the decision on which areas to 
evacuate, decision makers were 
reminded of the recent construction  
Recognition 
 
The threat of a hurricane was 
reinforced by Hurricane 
Andrew in 1992 
Recall/Compare 
The memory of Andrew and 
comparing that to what was occurring 





Floyd was judged as larger 
or potentially more 
dangerous than even Andrew 
Recall/Compare 
The memory of Andrew and 
comparing that to what was occurring 





The decision to evacuate was 
based on the storm’s size, 
track, and intensity 
Targeting  
Decision makers sought out specific 
weather data to raise their situation 
awareness  
Pre-arranged 
Fundamental to the state’s 
evacuation efforts was it use 
of HRVAC 
Targeting  
Decision makers sought out specific 




Prior to making the 
evacuation decision they 
notified the counties the 
evacuees would head for 
shelter 
Forecasting 
Foreseeing the outcome on the 
decision to evacuate residents  
Predictive 
estimations 
If we make decisions very 
broad, we stand the chance 
of putting more people on 
the roads than the roads can 
handle 
Forecasting/Comparing/Diagnose  
The evacuation decision was 
influenced by the message that would 
go out to the residents as a way to 
minimize shadow evacuations…they 







against what the roadways could 
handle.  Assumed information was 
analyzed to help make the decision 
In the case of Floyd, the 
stakes in the evacuation were 
raised by the sheer size of 
the storm 
Diagnose/Comparing 
Decisions were based on what they 





If officials based their 
decision on a storm track 
that portended limited impact 
and evacuation orders were 
relatively limited, thousands 
could be at risk if the storm 
actually followed a different 
track 
Comparing/Diagnose/Forecasting  
Evacuation decisions were influenced 







Central to the evacuation 
decision was the official’s 
belief, based on a 72-hour 
forecasting capacity that the 
storm would not strike 
directly.  
Comparing/Diagnose  
Weather data was used as a decision-





The fact that the storm might 
not come ashore did not 
mean there was no need for 
evacuations  
Recall/Forecasting/Diagnose 
Decision makers used past experience 
to realize the storm still had a large 





Officials expected that Floyd 
would have a more powerful 
effect on central and 
northeast areas  
Forecasting  
Based on weather data  
Predictive 
estimations 
They also believed that 
because the first stage of the 
evacuation would not put 
many cars on the road, there 
would still be enough 
capacity to accommodate the 
second wave of evacuees.  
Forecasting  
It was assumed and decision-making 




It was expected that the 
evacuation orders would 
mean that 1.3 million people 
would leave there homes.  
Forecasting  
The evacuation decision would lead to 
additional decisions (shelters)  
Predictive 
estimations 
The danger from the storm 
was thought to be limited to 
the coastline.  This was a 
locale in which the storm 
would be a Cat 1 event.  As 
Forecasting  





a result, officials believed 
evacuation should be limited.  
The NWS was confident the 
storm would turn.  
Forecasting/Recall  
Weather data influenced their 
decision-making and their knowledge 





We had reason to hope that 
those at risk would know 
who they were.  
Forecasting  
Decision makers anticipated residents 
would understand the threat  
Predictive 
estimations 
They were looking at the 
image of the storm and 
making a decision  
Situation awareness/ 
Diagnose/Compare 
Data was used to examine the size of 
the storm and establish the severity of 





We were expecting that most 
folks would pretty much stay 
in their own counties and not 
go to another county.  But 
they did.   
Forecasting  
Decision makers presumed the actions 







Table 16.   The 2003 San Diego Firestorm 
Informant’s Codes Analytic code Second Order Categories 
The fire quickly outstripped 
the capabilities of the small 
fire department  
Diagnose/Comparing 
Decisions were based on what they 





Because of the size of the 
fire, all vacations were 
canceled. Pendleton 
requested help from 
surrounding communities. 
Forecasting  
Sensing the fire was getting bigger 
Predictive 
estimations 
They reactivated five of the 
10 air tankers that had gone 
off contract for the rest of the 
fire season.  
Forecasting  
Sensing the fire was getting bigger 
Predictive 
estimations 
Before Saturday, the 
Governor declared a state of 
emergency  
Forecasting  
Sensing the fire was getting bigger 
Predictive 
estimations 
As a precaution, fire 
officials decided against 
lending out any more 
equipment.  
Forecasting  
Sensing the fire was getting bigger 
Predictive 
estimations 
Upon arriving on-scene, fire 
crews discovered that the 
fires location had been 
misidentified.  
Diagnose 
Based on what they were visualizing, 
the decided to move to another 
location 
Sense-making 
Because of the predictions 
for Santa Anna winds the 
route we would have sent 
ground forces in would have 
been compromised by the 
fire and the ground crews 
would have been killed.   
Deciding not to send crews in because 
of the situation  
Predictive 
estimations 
Therefore, he decided to 
wait for daybreak when he 
could return with equipment.  
Forecasting  
Based on what was known at the time 
and what was needed in the future a 
decision was made.  
Predictive 
estimations 
The reason we have these 
rules is because pilots 
couldn’t see in the shadows 
or the smoke.   
Bounding 
On a decision to not allow aircraft to 
fly after dark.  
Constraints 
Limitations   
The Sheriff’s deputies 
decided to order an 
Diagnose  




evacuation.  of the fire Evaluation 
Assessment 
Firefighters arrived just in 
time to keep employees 
inside the casino where they 
waited out the firestorm.  
Diagnose 
A decision based on the characteristics 





The Cedar fire was 
spreading at the rate of 
12,000 acres/hour, a rate of 
spread firefighters had 
never seen before.   
Comparing  
Once they had heard reports on the 
spread of the fire, they tried to recall 




Despite our expertise, we did 
not foresee how fast this fire 
would spread…  
Diagnose & Forecasting 
They tried to recall past experience to 





It was the drought that 
generated a situation where 
the fire behaved differently 
than anything we’d seen in 
the past. 
Recall 
Although they were able to recall the 




It was very difficult to 
manage because the fire was 
spreading so rapidly  
Diagnose  
Both visuals and what they were 
hearing hampered decision-making. 
Sense-making 
 
The supervisor flew west and 
decided that conditions were 
too windy and smoky for 
air drops 
Diagnose  
Base on what he visualized, compared 
to what he knew about air drops in 







When he saw the sky that 
morning, he knew what it 
was.  
Recall 
Visualizing the sky filled with smoke 
made sense that the fire was getting 
closer and decisions on evacuations 





He said he could not make 
any decisions until he could 
get a committee together 
Bounding 
Decision-making progress stalled until 
an outside entity contributed to the 
process 
Constraints 
Limitations   
We’re not going to put up 
aircraft that don’t have our 
frequencies and don’t 
understand our protocols  
Bounding 
Based on protocols, decisions stalled  
Constraints 
Limitations   
I didn’t consider the use of 
helicopters because no 
number of aircraft was going 
to change the situation.  
Diagnose  
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